Victims of Computer Misuse:Main Findings by Button, Mark et al.
 1 
 
 
 
Victims of Computer Misuse  
Main Findings 
April 2020 
 
Professor Mark Button, Dr Lisa 
Sugiura, Dean Blackbourn, Dr Richard 
Kapend, Dr David Shepherd and Dr 
Victoria Wang 
  
 2 
 
 
Contents 
Table of Acronyms .................................................................................................................................. 5 
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. 6 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 6 
Methods and Profile of Victims .......................................................................................................... 6 
Perception of Computer Misuse Crime .............................................................................................. 7 
Impact of Computer Misuse Crime ..................................................................................................... 7 
Financial .......................................................................................................................................... 8 
Disruption........................................................................................................................................ 9 
Psychological and emotional impacts ............................................................................................. 9 
Health impacts ................................................................................................................................ 9 
Damage to reputation ..................................................................................................................... 9 
Violation of the digital self .............................................................................................................. 9 
Loss of digital possessions............................................................................................................... 9 
Falling Victim ....................................................................................................................................... 9 
Security behaviours ......................................................................................................................... 9 
Victims’ response to victimisation ................................................................................................ 10 
Reporting Computer Misuse Crime .................................................................................................. 10 
Reasons for low reporting ............................................................................................................. 10 
Reporting experience .................................................................................................................... 10 
Advice and support received ........................................................................................................ 11 
Victims Needs ................................................................................................................................... 12 
Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................................. 12 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 16 
2. What is Computer Misuse Crime? ................................................................................................ 16 
Defining computer misuse crime ...................................................................................................... 16 
The extent of computer misuse crime .............................................................................................. 19 
3. Methods and Profile of Victims .................................................................................................... 22 
Methods ............................................................................................................................................ 22 
Profile of victims ............................................................................................................................... 23 
Caveats .............................................................................................................................................. 24 
4. Victims’ Views on the Recognition and Perceptions of Computer Misuse Crime ........................ 25 
5. Impact of Computer Misuse Crime ............................................................................................... 28 
Financial ............................................................................................................................................ 30 
 3 
 
Disruption ......................................................................................................................................... 31 
Anger ................................................................................................................................................. 32 
Anxiety .............................................................................................................................................. 32 
Stress ................................................................................................................................................. 33 
Embarrassment and shame .............................................................................................................. 34 
Isolation ............................................................................................................................................ 34 
Damage to reputation ....................................................................................................................... 35 
Negative changes in behaviour ......................................................................................................... 35 
Violation of digital self ...................................................................................................................... 36 
Loss of digital possessions ................................................................................................................ 37 
Health Impacts .................................................................................................................................. 38 
Suicidal thoughts/actions .................................................................................................................. 39 
SME/O ............................................................................................................................................... 39 
Financial ........................................................................................................................................ 39 
Disruption...................................................................................................................................... 40 
Reputational damage .................................................................................................................... 41 
No significant impact ........................................................................................................................ 42 
6. Falling Victim ................................................................................................................................. 42 
The weak point.................................................................................................................................. 42 
Victims with poor security habits ..................................................................................................... 43 
Passwords ......................................................................................................................................... 43 
Anti-virus ........................................................................................................................................... 43 
Risky behaviours ............................................................................................................................... 44 
Lack of engagement with security standards for SMEs .................................................................... 44 
Victims with good security habits ..................................................................................................... 45 
Victims’ response to victimisation .................................................................................................... 45 
Change in security behaviours ...................................................................................................... 46 
7. Reporting Computer Misuse Crime .............................................................................................. 56 
Reasons for low reporting ................................................................................................................. 56 
Status of computer misuse related crime ..................................................................................... 56 
There was no financial loss ........................................................................................................... 56 
Assumption non-police/Action Fraud initial reporting body would pass on ................................ 57 
Reputation and experience of Action Fraud ................................................................................. 57 
The police are unlikely to do anything because they are too busy .............................................. 58 
Wrongly advised it was not a crime .............................................................................................. 58 
Never heard of Action Fraud ......................................................................................................... 59 
 4 
 
Embarrassment and fear of the consequences of reporting ........................................................ 59 
Other factors discouraging reporting to the police/Action Fraud .................................................... 60 
Other websites where CMC is reported ....................................................................................... 60 
Action Fraud website .................................................................................................................... 60 
Police reporting websites .............................................................................................................. 61 
Reporting Experience of those Reporting to Bodies other than Police/Action Fraud ...................... 61 
Experience of Victims whose cases were reported to the Police and/or Action Fraud ................... 62 
Reporting experience of those reporting to the police ................................................................ 64 
Experience of those Reporting to Action Fraud ............................................................................ 65 
8. The Response of the Police/Action Fraud ..................................................................................... 68 
Disappointment at Action Fraud classification ................................................................................. 70 
Frustration at perceived lack of action ............................................................................................. 71 
Lack of any response ..................................................................................................................... 71 
Response to say no further action ................................................................................................ 71 
Lack of information on progress of the case ................................................................................ 71 
Advice and support received from police/Action Fraud ................................................................... 72 
Information/advice from Action Fraud ......................................................................................... 72 
Awareness of sources for advice/support to prevent victimisation ............................................. 73 
Visit or contact from the police to take a statement or provide support .................................... 76 
Experience of police investigation ................................................................................................ 78 
Survey victims’ views overall on Action Fraud, the police and other organisations compared ....... 81 
9. Victims’ Needs............................................................................................................................... 83 
Information about the case and what happened ............................................................................. 84 
Technical support .............................................................................................................................. 85 
Offenders brought to justice ............................................................................................................. 87 
Reassurance ...................................................................................................................................... 88 
10. Conclusion and Recommendations........................................................................................... 88 
References ............................................................................................................................................ 92 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................................ 94 
Appendix 1. List of interview victims and type of offence ................................................................ 94 
Appendix 2. Demographics of survey and interview victims ............................................................ 97 
Appendix 3. Non-police reporting websites ................................................................................... 100 
Appendix 4. Action Fraud Reporting Website ................................................................................ 101 
Appendix 5. Police Reporting Websites .......................................................................................... 102 
 
 5 
 
 
 
Table of Acronyms  
 
CMC – Computer Misuse Crime  
DDoS – Distributed Denial of Service  
ECVCU – Economic Crime Victim Care Unit  
CSEW – Crime Survey for England and Wales 
HMICFRS – Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire and Rescue Services  
ICT – Information and Communications Technology  
NCSC – National Cyber Security Centre   
NFIB – National Fraud Intelligence Bureau  
NPCC – National Police Chiefs’ Council  
ONS – Office for National Statistics  
SIA – Security Industry Authority  
SME/O Small Medium Sized Enterprise/Organisation  
2FA – Two Factor Authentication  
 
  
 6 
 
Executive Summary 
Introduction 
In the Summer of 2018 researchers at the University of Portsmouth were commissioned by the Home 
Office and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) to 
research victims of computer misuse with the broad aims:  
 To examine the nature and impact of computer misuse related crime on victims; 
 To assess the support provided to such victims and identify better means to prevent 
such crime; and 
 To examine the experiences and perceptions of those victims who have experienced a 
law enforcement response. 
 
Computer misuse crime (CMC) covers the cyber-dependent crimes largely grouped under the 
1990 Computer Misuse Act of hacking related offences, computer virus/malware/spyware 
related infections, denial of service attacks and ransomware.   
 
The reform of the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) with the addition of questions 
on computer misuse victimisation has exposed large number of victims: 470,000 of computer 
viruses and 500,000 victims of unauthorised access to personal information in the year ending 
December 2018 – which accounts for 9% of all CSEW crime (ONS, 2019a and b). The Cyber 
Security Breaches Surveys, found relating to SME businesses that large numbers have 
experienced a cyber security breach in the previous year at 60% of medium sized and 40% of 
small (Finnerty et al., 2019).  
 
Very small numbers of incidents are recorded by Action Fraud with 23,683 in 2018 illustrating 
significant under-reporting and attrition.  
 
Methods and Profile of Victims 
To conduct the research a literature review was completed, 7 stakeholder interviews, 52 
interviews (38 individual and 14 SME/O) with victims and via 252 responses by individual victims 
to an online survey administered by Qualtrics were secured.    
 
 The majority of victims secured via the survey and interviews had experienced some form of 
hacking at 62% of the survey and 34 of the 52 victims interviewed.  
 29% of the survey victims had experienced a computer virus or equivalent and 7 of the 52 
victims interviewed.  
 8% of the survey victims were ransomware victims and 7 of the 52 victims interviewed.  
 1% of the survey victims had experienced a denial of service attack, with 2 of the 52 victims.  
 Of the 52 victims there were also one who experienced multiple attacks and 1 who was the 
victim of harassment (although recorded as hacking).  
 Of the 52 interview victims only 4 had secured a response that resulted in a criminal justice 
sanction for the offender.  
 Only 13 received some form of police response such as a telephone call, visit or 
communication concerning an investigation.  
 7 
 
 18 victims reported and received no further action, with a further 5 who attempted to report, 
but were either denied the opportunity or there was no further action. 12 did not report to 
the police or Action Fraud.  
It is important to note some caveats relating to the methods used. The online survey is not 
representative of wider population of computer misuse victims; interviews were purposive and 
designed to get a spread of different types of respondents; and interview recall wasn’t always very 
good and some victims struggled to understand what type of offence had actually occurred. 
Some of the victims for this research were supplied via the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau and the 
categories victims were often recorded under were not always accurate. For example there was one 
victim of spam mail classed as a hacking victim, a victim of hacking classified as ransomware and a 
victim of a phishing attempt listed as a hacking victim.  
Perception of Computer Misuse Crime   
Both the majority of survey and interview victims rated CMC as either equivalent or more serious than 
traditional crimes such as burglary. On a scale of 1-20, with the latter the most serious survey victims 
rated burglary at 9.48, which compared to 8.26 for hacking for thrill, 8.98 for hacking to view personal 
information, 9.40 for sending a virus, 10.3 for hacking for fraud, 11.06 for sending ransomware and 
the most highly rated was 11.08 for hacking for voyeurism. The interviews did reveal a small minority 
who rated CMC a lesser crime.  
Impact of Computer Misuse Crime  
Both the survey and interviews with victims highlighted a wide variety of impacts that have been noted 
with other types of crime victim that included broadly: financial, psychological and emotional, health 
related, reputational as well as some new types of impact specific to these types of crime. The full 
report contains many actual quotes from victims, with their pseudonyms and the following box 
contains a small snapshot of quotes to illustrate victims’ views.  
The Impact on Victims in their own Words (Many more quotes in report) 
 
…so they left me with nothing, and then our mortgage was due to go out and other payments and 
nothing would have... And I was scared of all the bank charges and that, so I had to borrow some 
cash. Claire [Hacking, Individual]. 
 
…knowing that I couldn’t take any money out of the bank because there was nothing left was a bit 
shattering. Sarah. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
I was frightened it was going to happen again. Yes. I was frightened that whoever had done that 
would know we were vulnerable and probably easy access and might find another way in”.  Kathy. 
[Hacking, SME] 
 
God.  On the Saturday and Sunday, that was probably about six, seven hours, just for the eBay and 
PayPal.  Facebook was just…that was at least six hours on the day, speaking to Action Fraud and the 
police.  And going on and off and trying to do stuff.  And then ongoing messages to them.  So 
easily…I’d say 32 hours, I’d say. Catherine [Hacking, Individual].  
 
It’s massive, the disruption in fact is massive. Rachael. [Denial of Service Attack, Individual]. 
 
…he put me through hell for a few months, and he invaded my personal world, and tried to take 
away my future and my kids’ future, that’s the way I saw it.  Sophie. [Hacking, Individual] 
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Yeah I think for a couple of days I just couldn’t stop crying and I felt so low, but after that, I think it 
did turn more to anger and wanting to fight to get my money back... Claire. [Hacking, Individual]. 
 
The other impact of course is a feeling of anger, I suppose, that someone would put you through 
such inconvenience in an attempt to extort money from you; so mostly it was financial. I didn’t need 
any counselling.  I mean it was just bloody annoying because when you’ve got work to do you want 
to get on, and some little oik has caused you to lose half a day’s work. Steve [Ransomware, SME]. 
 
Oh, very stressful. I couldn’t work. I didn’t have time off work, I just sat at my desk and stressed, 
not getting work done. Alex. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
It is stressful, it is frightening in lots of ways.  And it’s very distressing that something you could 
work on for two years, can just, in a heartbeat, disappear…It had never occurred to me that 
something you put on the internet, doesn’t automatically stay there forever. Sabrina. [Hacking, 
SME] 
 
Yeah. The doctor said I couldn’t cope with what was going on because my mind was racing, I didn’t 
trust anybody, I was going very withdrawn and literally within three months he doubled the dose 
and that’s stabilised me. Leo. [Hacking, individual].  
 
…it’s going to sound really melodramatic, but at times it was life-threatening to me…anything could 
happen…and I would be a couple of times sat on the bridge wanting to throw myself off a bridge. 
Wayne. [Harassment, individual]. 
 
…they [the police] really underestimate the impact on a human being, you know.  When it reaches 
the point where you, as I said earlier, you feel like you've been physically assaulted, then it should 
be treated as assault of some sort.  Patricia [Multiple, individual].  
 
I felt powerless, angry, violated in a way, very angry and angry because nobody would listen to it, 
‘cause I kind of put my trust in the police, thinking that I’d just been kind of dismissed in a way, just 
another domestic situation.. Husky. [Hacking, Individual] 
 
I felt raped, you know, that somebody was watching me, so I was like I’m not using that laptop. 
Kathy. [Hacking, SME].  
 
 
Financial  
The survey victims experienced financial net losses ranging from £2 to £10,000, with a mean of £657 
and median of £250. Many victims experience no financial loss at all. Some do not experience a direct 
financial loss from the crime, but experience costs in dealing with the consequences of the crime, such 
as purchasing anti-virus software, securing technical support etc.  
Some SME/Os experienced substantial costs in dealing with the impact of CMC. In one case an SME 
incurred over £80,000 in costs dealing with the consequences of the incident. Another lost £40,000 
and 70% of their customers as a result of a hacking attack.   
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Disruption  
Many victims experience disruption as a result of a CMC. This can involve loss of access to services 
(such as banking, Facebook etc) or devices, time spent trying to deal with the situation and reporting 
it to relevant bodies.   
Some SME/Os experienced major disruption in their ability to trade or offer services. Some 
organisations experiencing ransomware attacks lost all their computer files and were never able to 
recover them all, some lost access for short periods causing interference in operations for only short 
periods. 
Psychological and emotional impacts  
Many victims noted psychological impacts such as anger, anxiety, fear, isolation and embarrassment. 
According to the survey those noting any impact (great or fair amount): 75% noted stress, 70% anxiety, 
52% fear, 51% embarrassment/shame/self-blame, 48% anger and 43% isolation.  
Health impacts 
Some victims reported the incidents had impacts on their physical or mental health. According to the 
survey those noting any impact (great or fair amount): 53% noted difficulty sleeping, 45% panic or 
anxiety related illness, 43% depression, 42% stress related illness and 38% change in appetite/weight 
loss/weight gain. A further 23% reported self-harm and 20% suicidal thoughts.  
Damage to reputation  
Some CMC can lead to damage to reputation. For example one victim interviewed experienced details 
of a past rape being exposed (among many other incidents) that damaged her reputation.  Another 
victim almost lost a job offer, as a result of a hacking by her then current employer, which damaged 
her status with the prospective new employer.  
For SME/Os reputation is often very important. Several enterprises reported probable loss of business 
as a result of the incident they experienced.  
Violation of the digital self  
Several victims interviewed described many of their digital devices and accounts as extensions of their 
physical selves and compared the attacks to acts of violation and in some cases even rape.  
Loss of digital possessions  
Some victims lamented the loss of digital possessions which were or were probably irretrievable as a 
result of the attacks such as photographs held in accounts, personal documents or email accounts.  
Falling Victim  
The interviews and the survey provided a great deal of information on the security behaviours before 
and after the incident.  
Security behaviours  
The interviews revealed a wide range of reasons as to why they had fallen victim to the crime. There 
were also some who had no idea how they had fallen victim.  
Several victims described ‘weak point’ moments where they described what they considered generally 
strong resilience, but because of the circumstances of a particular time they had fallen victim to CMC. 
These included being in a rush, focus on specific task or wider personal issues. These were often then 
able to be exploited by good social engineering by the criminals.  
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Some victims reported poor security habits such as poor passwords, using the same passwords and 
easily guessable passwords, such as family names.  
Several victims reported to using either no anti-virus, free versions or not updating it.  
Risky behaviours were admitted by some victims as a probable cause of their incident, such as visiting 
unlawful sites to watch pirated movies.  
Most of the SME/O victims had no knowledge of cyber security standards either before or after the 
incidents.  
There were also victims both individual and SME/O who reported excellent security knowledge and 
application, but who still became victims.  
Victims’ response to victimisation  
Both the survey and interviews found that there was generally limited changes in behaviour as a result 
of victimisation and that for many victims security behaviours were not strong.  
The survey found there was a small increase in use of device passcodes, software updates, data back-
ups and reporting; and a decrease in the use of device and website password managers. But there was 
no significant change in approach to protective authentication through strong passwords and 2FA for 
email accounts. 
 
It also found the experience of harm is unlikely to lead to a significant increase in protective 
behaviours, with only a minority of persons more cautious and the majority not changing their 
behaviour.       
 
Reporting Computer Misuse Crime  
The research discovered a variety of findings on the reasons for non-reporting of CMC and the 
experience of those who do try to report.  
Reasons for low reporting  
There were many factors that contributed towards low reporting. These included:  
● Some victims not considering such incidents as crimes;  
● No financial loss occurring;  
● Reputation and/or past experience of Action Fraud as poor;  
● Victims wrongly advised by police/Action Fraud their report was not a crime;  
● Victims never heard of Action Fraud; and  
● Embarrassment or fear of consequences of reporting.  
The research also found other service providers where victims often report first, such as Google, 
Facebook, banks etc do not always clearly suggest reporting such incidents to Action Fraud. Police 
websites were not always clear either on where to report such cybercrime and the Action Fraud 
website was more focused upon fraud than CMC.  
Reporting experience  
Some victims of CMC, particularly hacking victims, start with the relevant provider of the service where 
the hack has occurred to report, such as banks, Facebook, Gmail etc. For some victims this is the end 
of the reporting process, for others it is followed by a report to the police or Action Fraud. The survey 
and interview data generally illustrated a positive experience with such providers, particularly the 
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banks. However, there were some victims which highlighted challenges with speaking to and securing 
action from some providers of services via the internet.  
Regarding reporting to the police and Action Fraud victims had made use of both websites, the 
telephone and reported in person. Those reporting to the police were generally unaware of Action 
Fraud and some just wanted to report to the police.  
Regarding the police a significant number who reported to the police did so via 999 (36% of police 
reports). For both the police and Action Fraud the general satisfaction with the reporting experience 
was positive with just over 2/3 strongly or tending to agree their reporting experience were positive. 
Overall, however, this was slightly lower than other organisations that are reported to (banks, 
Facebook etc). There were, however, some negative areas where there was room for improvement in 
the services.  
Some victims struggled to secure police acceptance of their case when there was clear evidence of a 
crime. Husky (an individual hacking victim) was wrongly advised her estranged husband hacking and 
monitoring her laptop was not a crime because they still lived together. Sam (an individual hacking 
victim) was wrongly advised the hacking of her webcam was not a crime.  In another case Alex (an 
individual hacking victim) started with the police, was referred to Action Fraud, who then referred him 
back to the police. Where cases are complex involving offending over multiple forces there was also 
evidence of mixed responses.     
The telephone reporting experience of Action Fraud was generally positive for the victims. For the 
website it was more mixed, although most of the victims interviewed reported to Action Fraud before 
the subsequent changes to the Action Fraud website reporting pages.  
There was frustration among victims at the perceived or actual lack of action. Some victims had 
reported to Action Fraud and heard nothing. Some had heard news from Action Fraud, but this was to 
say there would be no further action, which was disappointing to them. Some victims claimed they 
had received no information on how the case had progressed.  
It is also important to note there were also a small number of victims who were also very happy with 
their response from the police, Action Fraud etc; even in some cases where there was no investigation 
or no identification of the offender.  
Advice and support received  
The interview victims who reported generally did not receive extensive support from the police/Action 
Fraud. Other than letters, few recalled any substantive support to better equip them to prevent future 
incidents. Website links on letters were not always followed up by victims or even recalled by some. 
The websites that offer advice and support generally had low recognition among victims, both before 
and after the incident.  
Among the victims interviewed a small number received a telephone call from the police and some a 
visit. Most, however, did not receive this, with a very small number receiving no response and some 
just a letter/email with no further follow up or updates on their case. SME victims of Ransomware 
were the most likely to receive a visit, but in most cases there was little the police could do.  
Very few victims experienced a police investigation and even less a successful investigation. Of the 52 
victims interviewed only 4 resulted in a conviction/caution for the offender(s) and 3 of these related 
to NCA cases.  
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Victims Needs  
The survey identified immediate support such as where to go to, who to talk to as the highest ranking 
need (82% rated very or fairly important), followed by technical support (76.2%), information support 
(74.6%), emotional support (64%) and financial support (63.5%) as the five highest.  
The interviews highlighted some of these. Many victims did not know what had happened and wanted 
to know what had occurred to them and to find out what the authorities were doing.  
Technical support was a significant need among many victims and particularly some SMEs. For many 
of these the CMC caused disruption which affected the business/organisation and to return to normal 
required expert help not in the organisation. For example ransomware victims wanted support in 
accessing lost files and cleaning computers. The immediate point of the incident was when many 
victims wanted technical support. Several victims wanted to be sure their devices were clean and 
wanted external reassurance to achieve this. Technical advice to better protect for the future was also 
wanted.  
Some victims were unsure where to secure such technical advice and relied on friends/family’s 
recommendations or established brands such as PC World.  
Several victims wanted justice and for the perpetrators to be brought to justice.  
Some victims just wanted reassurance to know they were no longer at risk from attack and that the 
incident had passed.    
Conclusions and Recommendations  
This research has provided some important new data on victims of CMC. First it has shown that most 
victims regard CMC as an equivalent crime to traditional crimes like burglary, with some considering 
it more serious, with a small minority regarding it as a lesser crime. The research demonstrated victims 
experience many of the impacts that other crime victims experience, with some overlap with fraud. 
There were also some victims who suffered severe impacts, as well as some noting very small impacts 
and regarding it as little more than disruption.  
The research explored how victims fell victim and showed in some cases they were tricked by 
sophisticated social engineering, some exhibited poor security behaviours putting them at greater risk, 
but some also had very good behaviours but still fell victim. The report explored the changes in 
behaviour as a result of victimisation and it showed in general there were not major changes. The 
reasons victims did not report were examined and then the experiences of those that did. The 
response of the police and Action Fraud, where there was a response was also explored. The research 
ended by considering what the victims wanted.  
The findings from this research led the authors to make the following recommendations, which fall 
under the following categories: improving reporting, improving victim support and advice, increasing 
resources for tackling computer misuse.  
Improving reporting 
The experience of the researchers dealing with victims and trying to understand their interpretations 
of what happened illustrated the challenges of definition. This was highlighted further with data 
supplied by the NFIB, which showed there had been misclassification of victims, not just among web 
reporters. The research was conducted with data drawn before changes to the online reporting system 
and better quality checks were introduced. Many of these issues may therefore have already been 
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addressed. However, it is essential that those reporting cybercrimes are properly classified for both 
measurement, investigation and response issues.   
Recommendation 1. The new systems for reporting, classifying and ensuring the quality of decisions 
undertaken by Action Fraud and National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) should be regularly 
monitored and evaluated to ensure the classification of CMC reports for both telephone and web 
reporting are being classified accurately [Directed at Action Fraud/NFIB].  
The central challenge of the name Action Fraud is for many victims this does not sound like a body 
cybercrime should be reported to, particularly when it does not involve fraud. Another challenge to 
reporting CMC (and fraud) is the name Action Fraud and the association of the word ‘Action’ with 
investigation and response, rather than reporting. Some victims actually think it is a special fraud 
investigation squad, which implies there will be an investigation by Action Fraud. For these reasons 
the researchers think the name should be changed.  
Recommendation 2. Action Fraud should be renamed the ‘National Fraud and Cybercrime Reporting 
Centre’ [Directed at Home Office, City of London Police]. 
This report identified a number of barriers to individuals reporting CMC offences. There are a number 
of recommendations below which aided with a focused communication strategy could enhance 
reporting:  
Recommendation 3. Greater prominence should be made of CMC offences on the Action Fraud 
website [Directed at Action Fraud].  
Recommendation 4. All police reporting websites should be reviewed to assess information 
provided on reporting CMC and where there are gaps advised to more clearly indicate how 
cybercrime can be reported with relevant links provided [Directed to Home Office and all police 
forces].    
Recommendations 5. The NCSC should work with key bodies such as Action Fraud, Getsafeonline; 
relevant service providers, such as banks, social networking sites, email providers etc who receive 
cybercrime reports, to provide a common set of words and website links to be placed upon their 
website to encourage them to report as crime [Directed to NCSC, Action Fraud and relevant website 
providers].    
There was also evidence of some staff who might receive or advise on reports did not grasp the 
legislation relating to CMC, particularly related to non-financial related crime such as harassment, 
voyeurism and domestic disputes where the research found examples of victims being wrongly 
advised their case was not a crime. The authors therefore suggest that all relevant police staff and 
Action Fraud staff should receive training in CMC offences and where such training already occurs, it 
should be regularly reviewed to ensure those experiencing it clearly understand what constitutes this 
type of crime, the seriousness of it and options for victims:   
Recommendation 6. All police officers, police staff and Action Fraud staff dealing with victims who 
may report crimes should be better trained in what constitutes CMC offences, particularly in relation 
to non-financial related cases such as voyeurism, harassment and domestic disputes; and the 
options for dealing with them [Directed to Home Office, College of Policing, Action Fraud].   
Improving victim support and advice 
The findings noted limited changes in behaviour by some victims from the survey and interviews. 
There were examples of victims who were hacked not improving their password security and 
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computer virus victims not engaging with anti-virus software. Some of the interview victims at the 
point of victimisation were clearly interested in cyber security, but were not offered appropriate 
tailored advice. This seemed to be a missed opportunity at the point of victimisation to enhance the 
resilience of the victim. The Economic Crime Victim Care Unit (ECVCU) pilot is an illustration of moves 
to more intensive support for this type of victim. This research has not evaluated the ECVCU and some 
of its activities would overlap with the following recommendation:  
Recommendation 7. Tailored packages of advice/support (based on National Cyber Security Centre 
guidance/advice) relating to the specific type of incident should be supplied to the victim at the 
point of reporting and evaluation of this support should be undertaken regularly to improve it 
[Directed at Action Fraud and the NCSC]. 
Recommendation 8. Further research should be conducted to evaluate different approaches to 
targeting victims and the impact these have on behaviours and future victimisation [Directed at 
Home Office].  
There was evidence of victims not receiving information on the progress of their case, which is 
contrary to the Victims Code. There was also considerable variation in the nature and extent of the 
responses victims received.  
Recommendation 9. Action Fraud and the police should do more to ensure victims do receive timely 
information on what has occurred in relation to their case [Directed at the police and Action Fraud].  
The Action Fraud website was the most recognised by victims, but the research team’s views were 
that it was not necessarily the best at supplying information to victims on prevention, support etc of 
CMC related offences. Getsafeonline and the National Cyber Security Centre provided the best advice 
in the view of the research team, but were low down the recognition list of victims. Action Fraud could 
either develop new website or link in a more effective way to the better websites. It might also be 
prudent to conduct some research with victims to determine the most effective websites for offering 
advice.  
Recommendation 10. Action Fraud, with the most recognised website offering advice, should work 
with the National Cyber Security Centre to ensure consistent and technically accurate advice on 
preventing and dealing with cybercrime  is provided to victims. This should also be built upon 
research to determine the most effective websites for interesting and changing the behaviour of 
victims [Directed at Home Office, Action Fraud, National Cyber Security Centre].   
Increasing resources for tackling computer misuse 
The findings for this research found many victims who did not receive a police investigation or any 
other form of police interest. Some victims did not want any police support, but many did. There were 
also cases where victims thought they had clear leads on who the offenders were (although in reality 
those leads may have been weak), but nothing occurred. It is clear that many victims who want police 
support do not receive it. There are clearly not enough resources of the police dedicated to CMC and 
many of the resources that do exist are built upon short-term funding, with no guarantee they will 
continue (HMICFRS, 2019). The authors believe more resources should be dedicated to this crime, 
how much, however, is clearly a political decision when there are so many demands on the police.   
Recommendation 11. The police should dedicate greater resources towards tackling CMC [Directed 
at the Government, Home Office and the police].   
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It is clear that even with more resources the police could not fill the gap in the support that victims 
want. Technical support was one of the main needs identified by victims and many of the demands 
that fall under this would not necessarily be something the police could or should provide, particularly 
in relation to SMEs. There is a challenge, however, of where to go to secure technical advice and who 
to trust. There are other examples in physical security of official schemes to indicate compliance with 
standards and that the operator is a legitimate supplier such as the Security Industry Authority’s 
Approved Contractor Scheme and the police service’s Secured by Design initiative. The National Cyber 
Security Centre has a variety of certification programmes, but these do not currently cover providers 
of cyber security services at the front line of victims. A scheme that provides a kite mark of approval 
and list of suppliers that could be provided to individual and SME victims would aid them in securing 
appropriate professional support.    
Recommendation 12. The Government should encourage a scheme to recognise suppliers who are 
accredited to appropriate standards to provide cyber security technical services to individuals and 
SMEs, similar to schemes such as Secured by Design and the SIA’s Approved Contractors Scheme. 
Victims could then be provided with links to a website which includes a list of relevant suppliers 
who have met those standards [Directed at the Home Office and National Cyber Security Centre and 
the NPCC].   
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1. Introduction  
The reform of the Crime Survey England Wales (CSEW) to include questions relating to fraud and 
computer misuse crimes (CMC) has exposed the significant levels of victimisation among the general 
public, accounting for over 40% of crime. There is, however, relatively little research on these new 
crimes in comparison to the traditional volume crimes and with the computer misuse offences even 
less. This research project has explored the views and experiences of CMC victims. It is one of the first 
studies to offer a deep assessment of these victims using largely qualitative research.  
The report will begin by exploring what is CMC, it will then briefly set out the methodology used. Given 
the new nature of these crimes and the gap in knowledge in their status among victims the report will 
then explore this, followed by the impact such crimes have on the victims. The report then explores 
how and why victimisation occurred and examines some of the behaviours. These sections provide 
clear context to the nature of CMC offences and how serious they are. This provides clear foundations 
to then explore why victims do not report, the experience of those that do and their views on the 
services they receive. The report then examines the needs of these victims and ends with a conclusion 
and list of all the recommendations made throughout the report.  
This report has been produced alongside two other outputs. There is a literature review that was 
conducted at the start of the project in the Autumn of 2018. This has been updated as the project 
progressed and for this reason this report will only reference relevant literature where necessary. 
Readers interested in the broader literature should consult that output. Second there is an output of 
52 case studies of the victims interviewed. This, in the victims’ own words, provides a detailed 
explanation from the victim of what happened, their response (and the relevant bodies where there 
was one) and the impact. The report is best read alongside these other outputs from the project.  
2. What is Computer Misuse Crime?  
Defining computer misuse crime 
Computer misuse crime can broadly be divided into two areas:  
● the unauthorised access to a person’s or organisation’s computer or related device 
and/or online accounts (including by hacking); and  
● the distribution of viruses and associated malware to disrupt or extort victims (ONS, 
2018a).  
The principal piece of legislation these offences fall under is the Computer Misuse Act 1990. 
This, however, does not restrict the offence to a ‘computer’ as it, ‘can include any device using 
operating software accessible online, for example, games consoles, smart phones and smart 
TVs’ (ONS, 2018b, p 2). The principal offences under this legislation are:  
Hacking offences:  
● Section 1: Unauthorised access to computer material  
● Section 2:  Unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of 
further offences. 
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Computer virus offences:  
● Section 3: Unauthorised acts with intent to impair, or with recklessness as to 
impairing, operation of computer, etc. 
● Section 3ZA: Unauthorised acts causing, or creating risk of, serious damage.  
● Section 3A: Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in offence under Section 1, 
3 or 3ZA.  
 
Action Fraud/National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) provide some more detail on the 
types of crime under this category by distinguishing the following reporting categories (Under 
NFIB 50):  
● Computer viruses/malware/Spyware (NFIB50A);  
● Denial of service attack (NFIB51A);  
● Denial of service attack (extortion) (NFIB51B); 
● Hacking – server (NFIB52A);  
● Hacking – personal (NFIB52B);  
● Hacking – social media and email (NFIB52C); 
● Hacking – pbx/dial through (NFIB52D); and 
● Hacking – extortion (NFIB52E) (ONS, 2018b).  
 
In the UK the distinction between cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crime has become the 
most common means to distinguish a range of crimes (Furnell, 2002; Levi et al, 2015 also 
distinguish cyber-assisted). The former are crimes that do not require information 
communications technology (ICT) to commit them, but can be expanded by the use of such 
technology. For example a lottery fraud could be perpetrated by traditional mail, but also by 
e-mail. Cyber-dependant crimes, however, can only be perpetrated by ICT (ONS, 2018b). All 
computer misuse offences are cyber-dependent. However, as noted above, other means, not 
necessarily cyber-dependent, might be used to help facilitate the offence.   
The nature of computer misuse, however, means that other offences also frequently combine 
with it. Offenders for instance might use phishing techniques to secure personal information 
to enable access to accounts (fraud by false representation) or corruption of persons with 
access to such information (bribery offences)  and once they have secured that information, 
then access the accounts/computer (computer misuse) of the victims. When they have 
secured access they might find embarrassing information and use that to blackmail the 
individual (blackmail). They may then seek to clean the money they have extracted from the 
victim (money laundering). Thus one act of computer misuse might be part of a much wider 
range of offences. Most commonly, however, computer misuse offences are used to facilitate 
thefts and frauds, among other offences. As figure 2.1 below illustrates there are a variety of 
consequences/aims of using computer misuse related acts some of which might not be 
criminal, some criminal and some civil torts. Starting at 12 o’clock the CM offence might be 
the sole offence. A person hacks into another account for the thrill to see if they do it or to 
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check if their partner might be having an affair. They might hack into an account to use 
another person’s services, such as Netflix or Facebook or to damage their reputation by 
defacing a profile or placing malware on a computer. At 7 o’clock on Figure 2.1 more serious 
offences begin to emerge where the CM offences are used to commit increasingly more 
critical offences such as harassment/stalking, fraud/theft and extortion/blackmail.  
Figure 2.1. Computer misuse offences and their links to other behaviours/crimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Computer 
Misuse 
Offences 
 
 Thrill/challenge 
 Information 
 Access to services 
 Damage  Harassment/stalking 
 Fraud/theft 
 Extortion/blackmail 
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The extent of computer misuse crime  
The most accurate measure of crimes against individuals is the Crime Survey for England and Wales. 
Statistics relating to computer misuse have only been gathered in the last few years. Figure 2.2 below 
shows the last three years of data for the years ending December 2016-2018:  
 
Figure 2.2 CSEW computer misuse offences in comparison (000s) 
 
ONS (2019a and 2019b) 
The table shows a slight increase over the period for all CSEW crime and fraud, but a significant decline 
in computer misuse offences.1 As the next Figure 2.3 shows, this has been caused by a significant 
reduction in computer viruses. It shows a reduction in computer viruses from just over 1.2 million in 
2016 to 470,000 in 2018 (years ending December). Unauthorised access to personal information has 
also declined, but only from just over 640,000 to just over 500,000 (years ending December). Even 
with this decline, however, CMC account for around 9% of all crime.  
The other measure for this crime are the number of computer misuse offences recorded by Action 
Fraud. These show a different trend with an increase of just under 14,000 offences recorded in 2015 
to 23,683, an almost 70% increase. Part of this increase is likely to reflect increased awareness of 
Action Fraud and encouragement to report such crime. However, what is perhaps the most significant 
issue is the significant attrition with the numbers recorded representing a tiny percentage of the level 
of victimisation, with the experimental statistics of ONS (2017) showing only 6.4% of computer misuse 
offences the police becoming aware of or reported to Action Fraud. It must also be remembered the 
Action Fraud data also includes reports by organisations and therefore this non-reporting and 
recording is likely to be an even lower percentage.    
 
                                                          
1 Caution should be taken when looking at the overall trends over time, given the short time series 
currently available. Although fraud and cyber estimates were introduced into the CSEW in October 
2015, they were only asked of the full survey sample from October 2017 and were only granted 
National Statistics status in March 2018. 
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Figure 2.3. CSEW computer misuse offences (000s) 
 
 
Table 2.1. Computer misuse offences recorded by Action Fraud/National Fraud Intelligence Bureau for 
years ending December 2015-2018   
 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Computer viruses/malware25 4,081 5,208 7,924 5,303 
Denial of service attack 246 579 325 259 
Denial of service attack (extortion) 134 400 286 224 
Hacking - server 506 610 681 845 
Hacking - personal 2,331 3,358 3,537 3,996 
Hacking - social media and email 5,275 4,484 7,631 9,033 
Hacking - PBX/dial through 572 524 364 230 
Hacking (extortion)26 800 1,071 1,005 3,793 
Total  13,945 16,234 21,753 23,683 
 
The Government also publish a tool which enables the number of judicial outcomes to be identified 
by offence (HM Government, 2019). Table 2.2 illustrates the very low number of cases that end in a 
judicial outcome with in recent years around 50 on average convicted and a similar number cautioned. 
When compared to the CSEW estimates for 2018, the overall attrition rate (the process of reduction 
in cases from the total number that occur through to those that result in a criminal justice outcome)  
is 0.01%. However, it must also be noted computer misuse offences are often used to perpetrate more 
serious crimes for which the offender is prosecuted.   
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Table 2.2. Number of judicial outcomes for computer misuse offences 2008-2018 
 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Cautions issued                         
52  
   
 63  
   
 46  
  
  71  
    
66  
    
44  
    
60  
    
74  
    
55  
    
62  
        
51  
Proceeded   
against 
 
                        
17  
    
19  
    
 
10  
   
 
 11  
     
 
25  
     
 
55  
     
 
53  
   
 
 57  
   
 
 60  
   
 
 64  
 
       
51  
Convicted  
                        
12  
    
10  
    
 
18  
    
 
11  
     
 
27  
     
 
40  
     
 
38  
    
 
35  
    
 
60  
    
 
47  
 
       
45  
Sentenced  
                        
13  
   
 10  
   
 
 18  
   
 
 11  
     
 
27  
     
 
39  
     
 
36  
  
 
  39  
   
 
 60  
    
 
47  
 
       
46  
 
Another source of data is the Government’s annual Cyber Security Breaches Survey. This seeks a wide 
range of data relating to cyber security experienced by businesses (and charities from 2018) and the 
strategies they have in place to deal with it. Figure 2.4 below shows the experience of cyber security 
breaches of small, medium and micro sized organisations, as well as charities. It shows a significant 
percentage of micro, small and medium sized businesses have experienced a breach, with around 60% 
of medium sized and 40% small. However, there is no attempt to estimate how many breaches went 
unrecognised, or to place ‘value’ on the threat posed by the attack. Therefore, minor breaches are 
counted equivalent to major ones.   
Figure 2.4. Businesses by size experiences of cyber security breaches  
 
 
Klahr et al (2016 and 2017), Finnerty et al (2018 and 2019) 
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3. Methods and Profile of Victims  
 
Methods  
The research for this report involved the following methods: literature review, stakeholder interviews, 
survey of victims and interviews with victims. The researchers approached a number of key 
stakeholder organisations to participate in this research to identify key issues for the research with 
victims and to assess the landscape of reporting, support and investigation of this type of crime. 
Interviews were conducted with representatives employed by the following:  
● Action Fraud/NFIB;  
● NGO focused upon pensioners;  
● NGO focused upon victims of domestic abuse, sexual violence and stalkers;  
● Victim Support;  
● Police constabulary;  
● Regional Organised Crime Unit; and  
● Large organisation with several thousand employees. 
An online survey was devised and 252 responses were purchased from Qualtrics who used their 
standing panel to find victims of CMC offences and it therefore represents a non-probability 
convenience sample (Etikan et al, 2016) and therefore should not be regarded as representative of 
the wider population of fraud victims.  A wide range of data was sought and this report will only refer 
to some of the most important. Respondents were asked to comment upon the CMC incident which 
had been most serious in the previous two years, which in the sample included:  
● 49% - hacking of an online account to access personal information or services [email, social 
media, bank account etc.];  
● 13% hacking of a computer or other device in your possession [laptop, smartphone, desktop 
computer etc.] to access personal information; 
● 29% - a computer virus, or other form of malicious infection, which caused damage or 
disruption to your device; 
● 8% - ransomware - where a form of malicious software caused your device to malfunction and 
where the perpetrator requested money, or another form of ransom, to restore your device’s 
functions; and 
● 1% - denial of service attack - where your internet access was deliberately disrupted, or 
services and information you provide on the internet were deliberately disrupted [e.g. your 
website or blog was crashed]. 
The researchers used a non-probability purposive sampling approach to secure victims to interview. 
The aim was to secure a diversity of victims based upon the different types of CMC offences, reporting 
and non-reporting victims, individual and small and medium sized enterprises/organisations (SME/O) 
victims, an assortment of demographic profiles and from the regions and nations of the United 
Kingdom. These victims were secured through the following means:  
● Lists of victims supplied by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau;  
● Contacts supplied via police force and National Crime Agency; 
● The University of Portsmouth Cyber-Awareness Clinic;  
● Promotion of research through professional networks;  
● Promotion of research through Qualtrics survey;  
● Promotion of research on University of Portsmouth website; and 
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● Some victims were identified in the media and where possible written to asked to participate.    
The list of all the victims with their pseudonyms; type of victim; where SME, their activity and the type 
of CMC offence(s) experienced. In total 52 interviews took place including 38 with individual victims 
and 14 SME/Os. One SME refused an interview but offered to provide written responses to questions 
(which they did for several in some depth). That victim has been given the name Mary and included in 
some tables because of the important information provided. Interviews were largely conducted face-
to-face with a small number conducted by telephone/skype where the victims preferred that or they 
were abroad on business or had emigrated since the incident.   
Profile of victims  
Appendix 1 provides a full list of the victims illustrating whether individual or SME/O, the type of 
offence experienced, the devices affected and a brief note on the consequences.  It shows  
 7 computer virus/malware victims; 
 7 ransomware victims;  
 34 Hacking victims (or where hacking primary offence); 
 2 denial of service;  
 2 multiple; and  
 1 harassment.2   
The literature review highlighted ONS data which showed:  
● Higher rates of victimisation among: men, professional and managerial classes, those with 
degrees and diplomas, unemployed and   
● Lower rates among: those aged 75+ , retired.   
Appendix 2 compares the key demographics of the survey/interview victims. Both individual and SME 
victims have been combined, because in most of the SME cases they were micro organisations that 
the interviewee was largely responsible for and they had dealt with the incident. Both survey and 
interviews had slightly more females than males. Over 75s accounted for only 1 response in the survey, 
but 7.7% of those interviewed. The interviewees were also more educated and higher status in 
occupational status. There was also a bias towards the South East. Table 3.1 provides an overview of 
the type of offence and what happened in terms of reporting and police action. It shows only 4 with a 
criminal justice action, 13 with any police interest and with the majority either not reporting or 
reporting and receiving no police interest.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Adds up to 53 due to inclusion of ‘Mary’ who wasn’t interviewed, but supplied detailed written response.  
 24 
 
Table 3.1. Interviewees by type of CMC, reporting type and response 
  
Non-
Reporters 
to Any 
Organisati
on 
 
 
Reporters 
to Non-
Police 
Organisatio
ns 
 
Attempted 
Reporters 
to 
Police/Acti
on Fraud  
 
 
Reporters 
to 
Police/Acti
on Fraud – 
No Further 
Action 
 
Reporters 
to 
Police/Acti
on Fraud 
where 
Police took 
some 
Action 
 
Reporte
rs with 
Criminal 
Justice 
Outcom
e  
 
Hacking  (bank 
account) 
 
 Charlie, 
Harold 
 Henry, 
Bernard, 
Hilda, 
Michael 
Claire, 
Caroline 
Sarah, 
Benjami
n, 
Natalie 
 
Hacking (non-bank 
account) 
 
Jackie Andrew, 
James  
Husky, Sam Peter, Ann, 
Liz, Alex, 
Cameron, 
Angeline, 
Joana, 
Jerry, Paul, 
Kathy, 
Justin 
Catherine, 
Patricia, 
Kate, Leo, 
Mathew, 
Authur 
Sophie 
 
Ransomware 
 
Steve  Aliya Ralph Nigel, 
Sabrina, 
Arnold, 
Mark, Kellie  
 
 
Computer 
virus/malware/spyw
are  
 
Vanessa, 
Gweneth, 
Jing, Oliver 
 Lily Terry, 
Godfrey 
  
 
Denial of Service 
 
 Rachael, 
Guy 
    
 
Other  
 
  Wayne    
Black = individual victims, blue = SME/O victims.  
Caveats  
Some caveats with the sample should also be noted. First some interviewees could not recall in detail 
the circumstances of the case. Their recall of some parts was hazy in some cases. There were a number 
of issues with the designation of what type of offence had actually occurred. Victims do not always 
understand what type of offence has occurred against them, only that something bad has happened 
or could have. There is a particular misunderstanding with hacking. For instance, one interview was 
terminated early because once it began it was clear the victim had not been hacked. An offender had 
sent emails to his friends/colleagues seeking financial help using an almost identical email to his own. 
The victim had not been hacked, but his identity had been used as a means to defraud others (although 
the impact and feelings might be the same). In another case a victim approached the team who had 
paid an invoice to a firm, whose email account had been hacked and then used to change the details 
of the bank account for it to be paid. The firm was the CMC victim, not the individual, who was a victim 
of fraud.  
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Another important caveat is that at the time of the research there was a pilot of the Economic Crime 
Victim Care Unit (ECVCU) in London, the West Midlands and Greater Manchester where more 
intensive support is provided. None of the victims for this research were covered by this scheme.  
There was also some issues with the lists of victims supplied by NFIB as the NFIB code listed did not 
always match what had happened to the victim. The scope of the victimisation of the sample supplied 
preceded a new system NFIB had recently implemented. Some of these quality issues, may therefore 
have been addressed, but it was clear that victims responses, particularly in relation to the web had 
not been quality checked in the past. The researchers, however, also found some issues with those 
reported by telephone too. Some examples of discrepancies are illustrated below:  
● Peter (NFIB52C - Hacking - Social Media and Email). Peter was receiving large amounts of spam 
mail which he thought was the result of a hack of one of his accounts. This seemed unlikely. 
Could possibly be classed as denial of service attack, but probably not enough emails to 
amount to that.  
● Hilda (NFIB51B - Denial of Service Attack Extortion). In reality this was probably an attempted 
fraud that may have involved hacking/malware. There was no recollection of extortion.  
● Terry (NFIB50A - Computer viruses/malware/spyware). Terry received a text to a false DVLA 
website. Under Home Office counting rules if the victim clicks on link and the computer is 
infected this would be appropriate classification, but although Terry clicked on link no clear 
evidence of malware.  
● Cameron (NFIB52A - Hacking – Server). Cameron had received phishing emails targeting his 
bank account details. The case similar to Terry, if clicked on link and malware. But no 
evidence of that and classified as Hacking of Server, not computer virus malware.  
● Wayne (NFIB52C - Hacking - Social Media and Email). This was actually harassment via signing 
Wayne up to unwanted websites to receive emails he did not want, such as the BNP. Without 
access to a real account of his this, is difficult to classify as hacking as they were just using his 
email address.   
● Some ransomware victims were classed across Hacking (Extortion) NFIB52E and Computer 
Viruses/Malware/Spyware NFIB50A.  
 
4. Victims’ Views on the Recognition and Perceptions of Computer 
Misuse Crime  
 
CMC offences are relatively new crimes about which there has been only limited research. They are 
also crimes that often do not involve a direct financial loss or involve direct physical harm to the victim. 
Such characteristics and the large levels of non-reporting to the police/Action Fraud could lead some 
to the conclusion they are lesser crimes compared to traditional volume crimes like burglary and 
vandalism where harms, physical and financial, are clearer. The research sought the views on the 
status of CMC offences so it is important to start the discussion of the findings with evidence of how 
serious this crime is considered and then, in the next section, the impact of the crime on victims. These 
will help to put into context the later parts of this report and the response victims receive.  
The survey sought the views of victims on how serious CMC offences were in comparison to other 
more traditional offences such as burglary, theft and criminal damage. On a scale of 1 to 20, with 1 
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being a very minor crime like theft of milk bottles from a doorstep to 20 being the most serious crime 
of murder, asked victims to rate the following offences in table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1. Survey respondents’ views on the seriousness of computer misuse crime 
 Male Female Overall 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Burglary 9.29 9.64 9.48 
Hacking for 
thrill 
7.92 8.54 8.26 
Hacking to 
view PI 
8.79 9.14 8.98 
Hacking for 
fraud 
10.73 9.95 10.30 
Hacking for 
voyeurism 
11.29 10.91 11.08 
Sending a 
virus 
9.21 9.56 9.40 
Sending 
ransomware 
11.38 10.8 11.06 
 
The table shows the most seriously rated was ‘hacking for voyeurism’, closely followed by 
ransomware. These and hacking for fraud were all rated higher than burglary. A computer virus was 
rated about the same as burglary, with hacking for thrill and to view personal information only 
marginally lower.  
Victims had a great deal to say on this issue and the majority regarded computer misuse crimes as 
equivalent if not more serious than burglary. There were some, however, who rated it lower. Some of 
the views of victims are presented below.   
Figure 4.1. Interview victims’ perspectives on the seriousness of CMC 
 
A Lesser Crime 
 
 
But I find things like that quite minor, like they’re just irritating, they’re not doing anything serious.  
But, if it’s obviously more severe, in terms of, like, somebody could potentially steal your data, 
somebody could hack into your bank, then obviously, I’d cast that as more serious. Vanessa. 
[Computer Virus, Individual].  
 
I don’t think computer misuse is as bad because obviously burglary, people have been into your 
house and they’ve rooted through your things. Okay, someone’s been into my computer and 
they’ve rooted around, but they haven’t physically touched things or… Liz. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
But again, I just feel like, you know, someone going into the physical space of the computer, is not 
going to stop me from using the computer, whereas someone coming into my house, burgling my 
house, is likely to make me want to stop going into the house.  Does that make sense? Paul. [Hacking 
and Denial of Service Attack].  
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I think it’s less important than burglary. I mean, burglary to me is a potential lead into violent crime. 
You know, if somebody had to be burglaring the place here and I had to come in for whatever reason 
and catch the person in the act, you’ve then got quite a high potential of some sort of violence 
happening. I think theft, fraud and what was the other one? Arnold. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
 
 
An Equivalent Crime  
 
 
[burglary] It’s virtually the same thing.  I think it’s the same thing, because you’re stealing someone’s 
property.  It doesn’t matter if it’s an object you can see or an object you can’t see, it’s still stealing. 
Ralph. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
I think they’re as serious. Sabrina. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Well, it’s the new burglary, isn’t it. Not through living here, although I have been burgled here but 
you don’t expect to be burgled anymore, you expect this sort of stuff to happen. Bernard. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
To me, it felt the same as if they had been in the house, you know, it was personal, so I felt that 
they had. And the fact that they’d been on to my... You know, they could get access to my phone 
and everything, I felt like they had been in the house. So to me it’s... Claire. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
I think it’s as important, equally important to criminal damage. I would so equally important to 
theft, equally important to fraud and what was the last one? Arnold. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
So, I don’t know, they are very different crimes, but at the same way, in one way they do affect you, 
there is no question about it.  It's a violation of you and your belongings and the way you do things, 
and I think that can be very hard.  Sarah. [Hacking, individual].  
 
 
A More Serious Crime  
 
 
Oh, way above burglary. Because burglary is a physical action that, to an extent – I mean, if 
somebody wants to get in they’ll get in – but to an extent you are a master of your own destiny with 
that. With viruses and the like, it’s technology and that’s brain power and way beyond the likes of 
a simple person like me. So, you know, I rate viruses and what-have-you way above burglary, way 
above. Henry. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
I feel they are more serious because the person who commits the crime feels like there is no 
recourse for their actions. They feel like once they’ve done it they feel like they’re completely 
untraceable, they’re completely untouchable. Alex. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
I would say it’s a lot more serious. But then, I would say that, because the biggest event here has 
been the computer fraud.  If we’d had a really awful burglary where everything was smashed up 
and everything was trashed, then my answer would probably be different.  The burglaries that 
we’ve had, I’ve learned from every single one of them.  But they’re largely an inconvenience.  They 
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cost more money in terms of replacement of windows, but it still doesn’t add up to the 9,000 that 
we lost… Natalie. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Oh, far higher than burglary. ‘Cause, I…burglary, these days, what can you steal from a house, you 
don’t have cash, you’ve got a television, who wants a great big television you can get them really 
cheap now. What can you steal from a house, jewellery, I don’t have any jewellery so no, I think, 
hacking you can take a lot more. Joana. [Hacking, individual].  
 
Oh, it affects you emotionally so much and also you're completely unaware that it's happened.  So, 
yeah, I do think it's right up there with the most invasive things that can happen to you personally 
as well, particularly when you are SME, and I know I keep going back to that but generally in SMEs 
the owner of the business or the person who's most culpable is generally really heavily involved as 
well.  So you do take it home whereas for bigger enterprises it's not as... But, yeah, no, I would rank 
it right up there with...it has a huge impact. Mathew. [Hacking, SME].  
 
I think it’s probably more serious, because it’s hard to detect at times, so it can be operating, and 
you’re not even aware of it. Kellie. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
I believe it affects the person more long term.  Criminal damage, you've got insurance, you can 
replace the things quicker, where cybercrime it takes longer to recover, I find. It's still affecting me 
this far on, it's almost a lifetime thing you've got to deal with. Where criminal damage, you can call 
up your insurance company, get it repaired, done. Cybercrime is more complicated than that. Sam. 
[Hacking, individual].  
Yeah, oh definitely, yeah [more serious].  Violating your intimate world, yeah. Kate. [Hacking, 
individual].  
 
 
 
5. Impact of Computer Misuse Crime  
 
The previous section revealed there were generally three perspectives on CMC offences. The largest 
group noting it is equivalent to traditional volume crimes, with smaller numbers noting a lesser type 
of crime or a more serious crime. This section will now explore the impact of CMC offences on the 
victims. It will show many of the impacts associated with traditional volume crimes also apply to CMC 
offences. The general literature on crime victimisation notes a number of common impacts upon 
victims and these include:   
● Psychological: a loss of self-control, anxiety etc; 
● Emotional: fear and anger etc;  
● Behavioural: changes to routines etc;  
● Physical: bruises, injuries etc; and 
● Financial: financial loss (Spalek, 2006).  
 
The experimental statistics brought some quantitative data on the type of impact experienced by 
victims of computer misuse. It shows the most significant impact was loss of time/inconvenience for 
both computer viruses and hacking. The next most significant was stopping access to websites, 
followed by feelings of shame, embarrassment and self-blame. This research identified a wide range 
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of impacts, which will now be explored. It is also important to note some CMC offences are pre-cursors 
to other offences such as fraud and there are therefore many similarities in impact to this crime (see, 
Button et al, 2014).  
The survey found that In terms of financial impact where those reported a loss it ranged from £2 to 
£10,000 with 38.9% of respondents reporting a financial loss with a mean among them of £657 and a 
median of £250. The far more significant impacts, however, were the non-financial impacts.  
 
Table 5.1. Psychological impact upon survey victims  
  A great impact Any impact (great 
deal or fair 
amount) 
No impact 
I experienced 
stress 
34.5% 75.0% 24.2% 
I experienced 
anxiety 
25.4% 70.2% 29.0% 
I experienced 
fear 
 
21.0% 52.0% 47.6% 
I experienced 
anger/violent 
thoughts 
13.9% 48.0% 50.8% 
I felt isolated 14.3% 42.5% 56.0% 
I felt 
embarrassed/ 
ashamed /self-
blame or similar 
17.5% 50.8% 48.8% 
 
Table 5.1 shows the majority of victims experienced emotional impacts. Stress and anxiety were felt 
by over 70% of respondents. Around half experienced thoughts of anger or fear. Table 5.2 also shows 
around half experienced sleeping problems or fatigue as a result of the incident. Two fifths 
experienced depression and a fifth to a quarter self-harm or suicidal thoughts.  
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Table 5.2. Health impacts on survey victims  
  A great impact Any impact (great 
deal or fair 
amount) 
No impact 
Difficulty 
sleeping/fatigue 
22.6% 53.2% 46.0% 
Change in 
appetite/weight 
loss/weight gain 
8.3% 38.1% 60.7% 
Stress-related 
illness/condition 
 
13.5% 41.7% 56.3% 
Panic or anxiety 
related illness 
14.7% 45.2% 52.8% 
Depression 16.3% 42.9% 55.6% 
Self-harm 8.3% 23.4% 74.6% 
Suicidal thoughts 8.3% 20.2% 77.8% 
 
The interviews confirmed a similar range of impacts upon victims and provided more depth to the 
negative experiences of victims, as well as highlighting the severe impact in some cases.  These impacts 
will now be examined with quotes from interviewees to further illustrate it. Before these are 
examined, however, the quote from Husky below illustrates what many victims felt.  
And it’s not always or only about money, there are more important things than money.  Yes, 
there is more important things than money, but there’s all different feelings that go into it, 
from the isolation, from the betrayal, from hopelessness. Husky [Hacking, Individual].  
Financial  
Many of the individual fraud victims did not experience any financial loss directly or indirectly. Indeed, 
for some of the victims, financial gain was not the purpose of the crime perpetrated against them. 
Husky claimed a substantial loss as a result of her estranged husband hacking her laptop, but it is 
difficult to determine to what extent this is a consequences of the hack:  
I said, okay, I’ve got to think about it.  In terms of the outcome of my divorce, I think that I 
probably lost in the region, of probably £50,000, yeah.  Plus all the cost of going to see a 
solicitor about something, it was like £350 an hour, so at the end, probably I would say, 
between £50,000 and £60,000, yeah. Husky [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Alex experienced a very small loss as a result of the hacker testing whether he could make purchases:  
He bought a very low priced item [59p] on my account to check that he could buy things on 
there. Alex [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Many individual victims did experience a loss, but were then reimbursed, but at the start of the 
incident it was not always certain they would be and initial losses sometimes caused financial pain. 
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Sarah’s bank accounts were cleared out and she had no money left, which was problematic as she was 
due to go to Scotland the next day:  
…I was going to be away from home in a hotel for the rest of the week with relatives in 
Scotland, I literally had about £5 in my purse because I had been intending to go to the bank 
on the way.  And, knowing that I couldn’t take any money out of the bank because there was 
nothing left was a bit shattering.  Sarah [Hacking, Individual] 
 
Claire was hacked and lost £7000 initially, taking her down to her maximum overdraft. She was 
subsequently reimbursed by the bank, but her partner had to help her in the short-term:   
Yeah. Well, I had to get £600 off [my partner] to put in my bank account because it happened 
just before my next... They emptied it right down to my overdraft of £1,700, so they left me 
with nothing, and then our mortgage was due to go out and other payments and nothing 
would have... And I was scared of all the bank charges and that, so I had to borrow some cash. 
Luckily, she had some savings, so I had to borrow off her to just tide me over. And because all 
my accounts had been frozen, she was just giving me cash so I could get to work and get fuel 
and just things that you take for granted every day when I couldn’t get access to anything. 
Claire [Hacking, Individual].  
 
For most of the victims where there was a financial loss it was the costs of dealing with the incident 
and enhancing security afterwards:  
Yes, I had to buy Kaspersky of course and pay for my computer guy to go and de-bug it. And 
so I suppose the financial implications were somewhere around £300. Henry [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
I had to take it to PC World to be cleaned and whatever they do. I had to pay for that obviously. 
I think I paid about £50 in total because my virus thing was out of date, so they updated 
everything while they were on and cleaned it all. Claire [Hacking, Individual].  
 
I'd say it's almost coming up to a £1,000 for the extras… Sam. [Hacking, individual].  
Disruption  
The disruption and time that it took to deal with was a major impact for many victims as the 
experimental statistics of ONS also found. The responses below only relate to individual victims and 
this issue will be explored later in this section separately for SME/Os:  
 
 
Very disruptive, so it was literally like, everything you logged on, into a search engine, it would 
direct you to these sites and then it would keep just, basically, popping up with these adverts 
every ten seconds, basically.  When you’re trying to do academic work, you can imagine it’s 
quite disruptive and irritating. Vanessa. [Computer virus, Individual].   
 
 
No, it was just the inconvenience that, like I said to you, I think I cancelled... Literally, I didn’t 
do them all at once. I rang the credit card companies up because I got a couple of cards. We 
pay them off every month, but there’s nothing... I rang them up to just, sort of, say look, I’ve 
been hacked, you know, maybe put a note on my account and then can you order me a new 
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card and that’s the reason. So, like I say, I’ve had a new everything just to be on the safe side. 
I’d say it was probably about a couple of hours, you know, ringing up, going through security, 
this, that and the other, explaining it. Caroline [Hacking, Individual].  
 
God.  On the Saturday and Sunday, that was probably about six, seven hours, just for the eBay 
and PayPal.  Facebook was just…that was at least six hours on the day, speaking to Action 
Fraud and the police.  And going on and off and trying to do stuff.  And then ongoing messages 
to them.  So easily…I’d say 32 hours, I’d say. Catherine [Hacking, Individual].  
 
 
It’s massive, the disruption in fact is massive. Rachael. [Denial of Service Attack, Individual].  
 
 
Anger  
Anger was mentioned by several victims. This was often directed to the offenders, but sometimes the 
relevant bodies, institutions and even to themselves for falling victim to the crime in the first place:  
 
 
Yeah I think for a couple of days I just couldn’t stop crying and I felt so low, but after that, I 
think it did turn more to anger and wanting to fight to get my money back, and also to stop it 
happening to other people. Claire. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
I just really wish that it had impacted him more so than it has because of what he tried to take 
away from me and my family.  Yeah, I really…I wanted him to suffer, and maybe that sounds 
petty, but he put me through hell for a few months, and he invaded my personal world, and 
tried to take away my future and my kids’ future, that’s the way I saw it.  Sophie. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
The other impact of course is a feeling of anger, I suppose, that someone would put you 
through such inconvenience in an attempt to extort money from you; so mostly it was 
financial. I didn’t need any counselling.  I mean it was just bloody annoying because when 
you’ve got work to do you want to get on, and some little oik has caused you to lose half a 
day’s work. Steve [Ransomware, SME].  
 
 
Anxiety  
Some mentioned anxiety about the potential consequences of the attack, whether they might be 
victims again and if the offenders might even visit them:  
 
Probably for the rest of the day.  It happened, like, midday and then for the rest of the day I 
just felt a bit insecure.  I don’t think I barely went on my phone for the rest of the day. James. 
[Hacking, Individual].  
 
I was hyper-sensitive to anything that I didn’t recognise. And whereas you get these stupid 
emails, as we said right at the outset, anything that ordinarily I would not think about, I 
became hyper aware of. So emotionally I was very, very sensitive to any possibly abuses or 
possible invasions into my privacy. Henry [Hacking, Individual].  
 
 33 
 
Not that I'm aware of but it does make you almost apprehensive to open student emails now 
which is a bit...it's not a good situation to be in if your students are then emailing you and 
maybe you're not opening their emails. Gweneth. [Individual, Computer virus].  
 
 
…I was really really worried, I was thinking, Christ what else are they into are into my PayPal, 
you know, how many years is this going to be, I mean, does it mean that they’re going to be, 
you know. And, I still don’t quite know, you know, whether…how much access they might 
have to my information, you know? Joana. [Hacking, individual].  
 
This was also an issue for some SME/Os:  
 
I was frightened. I was frightened it was going to happen again. Yes. I was frightened that 
whoever had done that would know we were vulnerable and probably easy access and might 
find another way in.  Kathy. [Hacking, SME].  
 
 
Stress  
Stress was also mentioned by many victims:   
 
Oh, very stressful. I couldn’t work. I didn’t have time off work, I just sat at my desk and 
stressed, not getting work done. Alex. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
It was quite stressful.  And I was quite glad that it actually happened on a day that I didn’t 
actually have them here.  They were both at the pre-school and school.  So it was easier to 
deal with ’cause I just spent the whole day on the phone and trying to deal with it. Catherine. 
[Hacking, Individual].  
 
Yeah, it was terribly stressful and it made me feel attacked. Rachael. [Denial of Service Attack, 
Individual].  
 
Stress was a particular issue for some SME/Os where financial implications or the performance of 
services were imperative: 
 
It is stressful, it is frightening in lots of ways.  And it’s very distressing that something you could 
work on for two years, can just, in a heartbeat, disappear.  And we had not realised that.  It 
had never occurred to me that something you put on the internet, doesn’t automatically stay 
there forever.  It could just be destroyed and taken away, or removed, unless you keep a copy 
of that, like any other form of information.  Sabrina. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Yeah, I mean, that…so, I was probably up till midnight on the night it happened and that, that 
was probably the most the most stressful four hours of my career. And I came in, in the 
morning fully expecting to get sacked because at the end of the day it's my webserver, it's my 
responsibility to ensure that this, you know, doesn't happen. Justin [Hacking, SMO].  
 
Yeah, it's incredibly stressful because, like I was saying earlier, on about the milestones that 
the payment card industry set throughout the investigation process that you have to achieve 
and, unfortunately for me, I was going on holiday right in the middle of it.  Mathew. [Hacking, 
individual].  
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Embarrassment and shame 
Embarrassment and shame was another consequence frequently mentioned, particularly by those 
whose victimisation related to social engineering:  
 
Just embarrassment really. Ringing up the bank and saying oh yeah, I’ve been a victim of… It’s 
just embarrassing to admit that you’ve been subject to something which is so simple. Charlie. 
[Hacking, Individual].  
 
I was embarrassed because the IT team said, why did you click on it, you should know better.  
Which I should have known better. Gweneth. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Well, I wouldn’t say embarrassed. Well, in front of some friends rather embarrassed because 
know-all friends were like, you should’ve put the phone down. Yes, I suppose I did. Bernard. 
[Hacking, Individual].  
 
I was embarrassed because various people in work, because of my job, I have… It’s a funny 
area, being a vicar, because your sort of personal life and your working life mingle in a way 
that they probably won’t do in other professions. So on my personal Facebook, there are 
people, with family, like my cousin, but there are also lots of parishioners as well, who’d got 
this message and really thought for a minute I was asking them to do something that was, you 
know, that wasn’t quite right over a Facebook message. So that was why I was embarrassed, 
to have to then tell these people, no, it wasn’t me, it was somebody who had taken over my 
Facebook. Plus, at the time, I was working on the Facebook page for our church and I was 
telling them how to be…how careful we had to be and security, and somebody had actually 
somehow had got my Facebook details and logged in and sent this out. So, yes, it was just the 
embarrassment of the situation. Angeline. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Yes, I think – yes, course, I was embarrassed about BNP and stuff... Wayne. [Harassment, 
individual].  
Isolation  
Some victims mentioned feelings of isolation as an impact of the crime, this was particularly related 
to the feeling that nobody was doing anything about the incident or seeking to help them.  
 
It’s like hello, somebody’s just broken into our house and stolen all our things and nobody 
wants to know. Kathy. [Hacking, SME].  
 
I then felt, afterwards, there was just nothing that could be done about it and it wasn’t taken 
particularly seriously. In the grand scheme of things, you know, how serious was it? You know. 
Looking at it like that. But I would say I felt isolated. Angeline. [Hacking, individual].  
 
Husky felt particularly isolated as the police would not even accept her case in the first place:  
Yes, there is more important things than money, but there’s all different feelings that go into 
it, from the isolation, from the betrayal, from hopelessness. Husky [Hacking, Individual].  
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Damage to reputation 
Hacking and the leaking of personal information can damage the reputation of the victim. If there is 
sensitive personal information and this is leaked into the public domain, such as marital affairs, sexual 
preferences, pornography, political views etc which are held in accounts, files etc this can be damaging 
to the victim. Alex was worried about the damage the perpetrator was doing to his reputation:  
 
I definitely wasn’t fearful…like I wasn’t afraid that he was going to show up in real life. But I 
was afraid that he would find the means to escalate this, to either present misinformation 
about me to get me listed, to get me targeted, something like that. One of my fears is that he 
would use the limited information he had about me to misrepresent me online, and I thought 
that the fact that he was pestering me for more than 12 months meant that he was a serial 
abuser. Alex. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Patricia was very worried about the damage to her reputation and the impact of that:  
And you would genuinely think…and the online stuff, I mean, it's very difficult to get work.  
I've just finished a book [inaudible 0:43:04] which is the [name of book], and I have said to 
them, you're going to have to take my name off the front of there and [inaudible 0:43:18] 
because I cannot, you know, spend the rest of my days thinking that these arseholes are 
literally going to carry on doing what they're doing, you know. Patricia. [Multiple, individual].  
 
Leo, as a Councillor, was also worried:  
Yes, it did affect my reputation because I was a councillor … in the [location] area, and I was 
going to stand for election this year but because of what’s gone on if I stood for election this 
would be made public. Leo. [Hacking, individual].  
 
Sophie was worried the incident would damage her reputation with her new employer.  
And of course, also with that, the fact that I knew my knew employer, it made me feel even 
worse, because you know, he’d probably chosen me over and above other people,  because 
of our previous history, and then for him to be, in effect, let down so badly, before I’ve even 
started, that’s horrendous. Sophie. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Negative changes in behaviour  
Changes in behaviour will be considered in more depth later in the report. However, as an illustration 
here the impact for some did lead to negative changes in behaviour as the case of Sam illustrates 
below:  
It obviously made me feel very vulnerable.  I don't do things like Skype anymore, I don't have 
any of that, so my webcams are now covered.  We have a CCTV camera in our house but if 
we're in where it's placed, it has to be turned off when I'm in the room. I can't have any 
cameras actually focused on me because it just makes me paranoid who's watching.  Sam. 
[Hacking, individual].  
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Violation of digital self 
An important finding is that several victims viewed the victimisation as a violation of their digital self. 
The growing use of IT devices and their importance in our lives for many means they can be considered 
a prosthesis to our physical being. For some, attacks on these devices were considered equivalent to 
physical attacks.  
Some of the victims that noted the most serious impacts identified feelings of violation. For some of 
these victims the impact was so serious they compared it to rape. Henry compared the incident to 
having been ‘raped’ and the violation of his intimate private working space was intense:  
…I felt as though... I’d been burgled years ago, when we moved into a new house, and the 
sense of invasion is vile. I can imagine it must be like rape. And so the emotions started to kick 
in as I realised that they’d come in. And my computer, because I’ve got a big, powerful PC up 
there with four screens, because of the writing, and it’s very much a part of me. And I get an 
immense amount of pleasure and satisfaction out of writing, so the computer is very much a 
piece of satisfaction for me. And to have it invaded like that made me feel really quite ill.  
 
Henry articulated very well the feelings of violation that resulted from the incident:  
 
No question. And, as I say, in part I think it’s because of the intimate relationship I have with 
my computer because of the writing. You know, I don’t like swearing but when I’m writing my 
language is foul, which is the frustration of getting it from there onto the screen. And that’s 
part of the intimate relationship. Whilst the computer was away, I had a notepaper and pencil 
because, you know, the stuff keeps coming into you to write. And I was handwriting it, 
longhand, and then crossing it out and then rewriting it again and doing something, three or 
four full pages of writing, for this one idea. And I started to realise just the relationship I had 
with my computer and how intimate it is, in the ability to be able to do that. So yes, the 
violation was intense. Henry. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Kathy just simply compared the secret watching of her to being raped:  
I felt raped, you know, that somebody was watching me, so I was like I’m not using that laptop. 
Kathy. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Husky also felt violated:  
 
I felt powerless, angry, violated in a way, very angry and angry because nobody would listen 
to it, ‘cause I kind of put my trust in the police, thinking that I’d just been kind of dismissed in 
a way, just another domestic situation, part of a domestic situation… But it’s just…it’s just 
much more than somebody, just the action of going into your computer, yes, that you feel 
violated, you feel that, you know, but it is the damage that it causes in somebody’s life.  Husky. 
[Hacking, Individual].  
 
As did Nigel:  
Yeah. But you just feel hmm, what’s happened here. And then you’re sort of violated. Nigel. 
[Ransomware, SME].   
 
Patricia compared it to a physical assault:  
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And I think the police are overwhelmed, but I also think they really underestimate the impact 
on a human being, you know.  When it reaches the point where you, as I said earlier, you feel 
like you've been physically assaulted, then it should be treated as assault of some sort.  Patricia 
[Multiple, individual].  
 
As did Leo:  
I felt violated and really upset because I’d lost…I’d literally spent four weeks gathering all the 
evidence together and I thought it was secure, and did not understand or realise how 
vulnerable I was storing stuff online. It’s like – I’m trying to think of the best way – I feel 
violated, like someone’s done something to my body against my will. I access my online 
account it feels like they’ve done that my brain; they’ve done something to it without my 
permission. It’s like – I’m trying to think of the best way – I feel violated, like someone’s.. 
Kate felt the incident was an invasion of her privacy and made her feel sick:  
And so, it felt like my privacy had been exposed, and I didn’t know how or why anyone would 
want to do that.  So, the picture was of my boyfriend, who’s still my partner, in the bath, but 
it wasn’t a sexual pose or anything like that, he was just blowing a kiss to me from the bath, 
but with bubbles, but it still would be an inappropriate picture, I’m a professional, as well, and 
it made me feel really scared to think that somebody could access my private account, and 
my emails and my pictures, and see that.  Kate. [Hacking, individual]. 
 
Leo felt they had accessed his body and brain:  
 
[they have] done something to my body against my will. I access my online account it feels 
like they’ve done that [to] my brain; they’ve done something to it without my permission.  
Leo. [Hacking, individual].  
Loss of digital possessions  
The digital self can extend to the many personal things that are kept online, particularly things like 
photographs or things linked to our digital persona such as email addresses, webpages etc. Several 
victims lamented the loss of these as a result of the incident:  
This is like, I’ve lost all my photos, all my photos from the laptop have gone.  But all my videos, 
with all the NCT work.  Every file I’ve uploaded has disappeared.  So we had our sale on 
Saturday that I haven’t actually been able to do, and I’m the co-ordinator.  So it was a rubbish… 
Catherine. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
The other thing I was really annoyed about was I had to change my email address.  Now, I’d 
had the same email, you know when kids have stupid email addresses, it was a normal email 
address, it was just my name, and I’d had this email address for like 12 years or something.  
And I had to change it, and I had to close it.  And that was annoying, because I liked my old 
email address.  But, at the time, I didn’t really know how to deal with the email bomb stuff.  
‘Cause like I say, I was getting emails just one after the other, just constantly.  I probably should 
have contact Microsoft, but I just thought, close the email, just get rid of it. Paul. [Hacking and 
Denial of Service Attack].  
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Health Impacts  
A small number of victims reported health issues as a consequence of the incident, often related to 
mental health, however, some noted physical impacts. Claire had headaches:  
 
 
I think a lot of headaches and I took a lot of painkillers in those first few days. Yeah, I was 
hitting the painkillers, if I remember, and all the phone calls, everything going on, I was just 
all...like your head is just… Claire. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Some victims had existing conditions which were exacerbated:  
 
To be honest, I suffer with my health anyway, I suffer with fibromyalgia, so it probably just 
made the pain a bit worse at certain periods of time, not knowing the outcome of things or 
the initial investigation. Sophie. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
I’ve got Crohn’s disease so that does get flared up with stress. Catherine. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
 
Well, I have multiple sclerosis, so one of the first things they say to you, is stress is not your 
friend.  Because multiple sclerosis lives in your immune system, so stress hits your immune 
system and it weakens it.  So yes, I was suffering from attacks of fatigue more, generally, my 
health was less well, my time was utterly dominated by sorting these things out.  Sabrina. 
[Hacking, SME].  
 
Several victims reported mental health problems as a result of the incident:  
 
I just really hit a low. I think it was the morning after and I just said to Claire...I feel so stupid 
and all this and I want to just curl up and die. And she went, don’t you dare say things like that 
and it’s only money, and, you know, all that then. But I did hit a bit of a rock bottom, yeah. 
Claire. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Well, at that time I was over everything, at least one on top, I was an adrenalin junkie.  So it 
means that I was having a full time job, two children, court appearances, on average that went 
on up until probably last year, on two, or three hours sleep a night.  Husky. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
Oh, I was awful, if was awful, I felt…I think it’s really difficult with PTSD anyway to be, you 
know, having nightmares and flashbacks and night terrors and anxiety and it was suicidal 
thoughts and stuff.  But then to have this level of persecution, you know, and… Wayne. 
[Harassment, individual].  
 
Yeah. The doctor said I couldn’t cope with what was going on because my mind was racing, I 
didn’t trust anybody, I was going very withdrawn and literally within three months he doubled 
the dose and that’s stabilised me. Leo. [Hacking, individual].  
 
I was put on antidepressants.  Sam. [Hacking, individual].  
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Suicidal thoughts/actions  
The survey found around a fifth may have had suicidal thoughts as a result of victimisation. There were 
a very small number of interview victims that reported suicidal thoughts or actions:  
 
Yeah, yeah, and to me, at times it was – it’s going to sound really melodramatic, but at times 
it was life-threatening to me, this was…anything could happen, I could get an email or 
whatever and that was me, boom, and I would be a couple of times sat on the bridge wanting 
to throw myself off a bridge.  And I think that was the difficulty with the situation, that when 
somebody says, you know, because there’s no money involved, that just makes it even worse 
then, you think, hold on, but this is my life that’s involved, not money, why is that more 
important, why is that… Wayne. [Harassment, individual].  
 
Yeah, well, again because I have it as part of my condition, but there were…I remember the 
day I think that I was registered with the BNP and the EDL, because both of those are 
organisations that I despise, that really got to me, yeah, and I tried to kill myself three times 
that day. Wayne. [Harassment, individual]. 
 
You know, they pretty much put me…they very nearly put me in a grave, to be honest.  And 
I've been through, you know, a pretty shit time and worked very hard to be well after what 
happened in [name of country], really hard.  Patricia. [Multiple, individual].  
 
 
SME/O 
The interviewees who worked for or ran SME/Os reported many of the same impacts as the individual 
victims and some of those were noted above. As some were effectively owners of small businesses 
this is not surprising. However, this section will focus in-particular on the financial, disruptive and 
reputational impact on SME/Os.  
Financial   
Most of the victims did not lose any money directly as a result of the attack, but some did lose money 
having to deal with the incident. Mary estimated the multiple attacks cost her organisation £82,000 
in additional costs dealing with the incident.  
I would say possibly…about a half day of work time, the following Monday, to rebuild and 
reinstall from back up, so cost wise, four/five hundred pounds. Steve [Ransomware, SME].  
 
Probably because it’s the staff members trying to recoup and with our offsite back up we’ve 
got to pay for it.  So then there’s all the data transfer as well, which this theatre hasn’t got the 
money for, you know, it’s like an added cost we didn’t need. Probably a good couple of grand. 
Ralph [Ransomware, SME]. .  
 
all of the software.  I paid for all of the software.  We access grant funding, so again, there’s 
your other thing, we wouldn’t have any, and I prefer for our donations to the site to go to 
people doing work for us rather than infrastructure, so yeah, it cost me money personally.  
None of this software is particularly cheap, particularly when you have no budget whatsoever 
[for computer security]. Sabrina [Hacking, SME].  
 
Then we did, only just recently, we’ve had to do it. But I did buy Kaspersky [£35] in order to, 
you know, improve the security. Kathy [Hacking, SME].  
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Probably around £2,000 or so. We did some rough estimates at the time and tried to decide 
whether it was worth claiming on insurance and we just, kind of, said look, it was a bit 
disruptive but it’s not such a disaster, not such a massive expense that it’s worth going down 
that route. Arnold. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
Forty grand. Without a shadow of a doubt.  The amount of customers that cancelled, bearing 
in mind, they’re paying £200 a month.  Then it’s your reputation on top which you can’t really 
put a price on that….With a lot of begging, pleading, and everything else, probably about ten 
days, but cost us thousands upon thousands of pounds.  We lost 70 per cent of our customers. 
Authur. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Disruption  
Disruption for any organisation is negative and can have major consequences. Ralph noted the 
significant disruption the incident caused to the arts venue:  
It virtually corrupted all of our files.  It did bring the theatre down to its knees, or very close 
to it, but then we have got like also backup, but because all the computers, they’re not the 
best computers in the world so the antivirus and that lot are not up to date, but it did give us 
a lot of struggle with that.  Because especially being a small theatre and we haven’t got the 
funds for the information technology ….[inaudible 0:03:10] in. Ralph [Ransomware, SME]. 
 
Sabrina also lamented the disruption:  
It cost me a lot in time, which wasn’t just about time I could have been working on other stuff 
for the website.  Sabrina [Hacking, SME].  
 
Steve lost half a day dealing with the incident:  
So, what I did…luckily it was only one machine.  It didn’t spread across the network.  So I shut 
the machine down.  I wiped the hard drive, rebuilt it with a fresh version of Windows 10, and 
then I had a back up and I restored all the data from a back-up because the best…as you know, 
the best prevention against these types of attacks is to have your data backed up either offline 
or in a network location where the virus isn’t going to get to. Steve [Ransomware, Individual].  
 
Nigel noted how the disruption could arise weeks or months after the incident:  
And it’s not until we went out and bought another computer and you’re looking at, down here 
we’ve got lots of animals, and you’re looking for it, I haven’t got that document anymore. It’s 
all those little things, it could be months later when you’re like, I’ve got to rewrite that, I ain’t 
got the document for the [animals]. We had a database on all our [animals], when they were 
born, what [animals] they’ve had – gone. And they were my only copies. Yeah, lost a lot. Nigel. 
[Ransomware, SME].   
 
Guy illustrated how the DDoS attacked caused major disruption to the school where staff couldn’t do 
their work, couldn’t order resources for the school, they couldn’t pay staff or contractors correctly to 
name some:  
 
So the way that obviously a school works in the modern days, the majority of our resources 
are stored in the cloud, which meant from the perspective of the ability of teachers first and 
foremost to be able to access free planned work and all that kind of stuff, it was particularly 
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difficult.  They were having to do stuff from home and print things from home.  So certainly 
workload wise for teachers it caused major issues.  From the administration side of the school 
which is sort of more my area of focus, probably somewhere between I'd say 80 per cent and 
90 per cent of the systems that we use in order to process the administration of the school 
are internet based.  So not having the ability to run a financial system for two weeks meant 
that we couldn't place orders for necessary resources.  It meant that we couldn't meet 
statutory obligations for the government and the taxman and all those sorts of things, from 
our HR system.  It meant that we were unable to access the system to process changes to 
payroll, so people's pay was affected.  There are many, many examples, but those are the kind 
of things that occurred.  During that time obviously our IT guys on site were impacted hugely 
because they couldn't get on with their day to day work because they spent essentially two 
weeks working with the council in order to try and resolve the issues.  It was two days of 
complete loss and then up to two weeks if my memory serves me correctly, of intermittent 
use.  So lots of frustrations across the building as you can probably imagine.  Guy. [Denial of 
service attack, SMO] 
 
Reputational damage 
Reputation is important to the success of many organisations. Some of the SME/O organisations 
interviewed reported significant issues here. Kathy’s whose business’s email had been hacked with 
the offenders trying to change the bank details customers paid for services reported significant 
reputational damage:  
Well, you know, our name might have been smudged because the doctor [who paid to 
offender’s bank account] might then say, huh, [x Gas and Plumbing], bad experience, wouldn’t 
use them again. Yes, they did the work but it cost me five grand to have a new boiler put in. 
Because he paid once and it went to the fraudster, then he paid us again, so... Kathy. [Hacking, 
SME].  
 
She went on:  
No, but a lot of our business is by word of mouth, recommendations. And he’ll never deal with 
us again... Kathy. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Some of the SMEs operated in IT and becoming a victim of cybercrime  was very embarrassing and 
potentially damaging:  
 
Perhaps, well, certainly, from a professional point of view yes, you know, when you’re in the 
IT industry and you become the actual target, yeah, is… Mark. [Ransomware, SME].   
 
Mathew, who ran an online retailer, was very worried the hacking of his website might result in lost 
customers:  
But in the back of my mind for the whole time I'm thinking, are we going to lose any customers 
from this?  Going through the list of credit card information they'd sent us through that had 
been cloned from us some of our best customers' names are on the list.  So that was obviously 
at the back of my mind as well.  And then also thinking you do feel like you've been burgled.  
So, yeah, it's stressful. Mathew. [Hacking, SME].  
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For Justin the linkage of the school website to a porn website was obviously damaging and caused 
damage to the school reputation:  
 
[the redirection] had quite a big impact in terms of pupils saw it, word got around to pupils.  
So, lots of pupils were going on it, parents saw it, lots of them were, you know, for the next 
few days were contacting the headteacher with understandable concerns that this stuff had 
been, you know, accessible on a school-owned domain. Justin. [Hacking, SMO].  
 
No significant impact  
The focus so far has been upon a variety of impacts. However, it is important to note that there were 
a small minority of victims where there was no significant impact with very few of the impacts listed 
above. The incident was nothing more than a minor inconvenience, which caused disruption such as 
having to reset a password or deal with a computer virus. The sample of victims interviewed is biased 
towards reporting victims and it is possibly likely that interviewing a larger pool of non-reporting 
victims might yield more victims with no significant impact with only minor disruption, as noted by 
the ONS data.  
6. Falling Victim  
The interviews with victims revealed a wide range circumstances of how they fell victim. Some of the 
incidents involved the victim having no idea who the perpetrator was or how they had fallen victim. 
For these victims the random nature of the victimisation left some with anxieties (which was explored 
earlier). Some of the victims interviewed did understand partly what had happened either clearly or 
vaguely. There were a number of victims interviewed who had fallen for social engineering techniques 
of varying sophistication. Some had interacted with the offender(s) over the telephone and allowed 
them to remotely take over their computer, some had responded to fake emails, some had visited 
websites that on reflection they thought were false. Some of the victims also acknowledged 
afterwards they had exhibited behaviours putting them at greater risk, such as having poor passwords 
or going to websites where there is a high risk of malware. There were also a handful of victims that 
knew immediately or soon after who the perpetrators were. There were also a very small number of 
victims who had excellent security knowledge and procedures who were victims as a result of factors 
beyond their control.  
The weak point  
Several victims described what could be described as a ‘weak point’ moment. These victims generally 
considered themselves to have strong resilience to such attacks normally, but because of unusual 
personal circumstances on the day of the incident fell for some form of social engineering. Henry was 
busy writing his book and his mind was focused upon that, so his guard was down when they contacted 
him and seemed plausible:   
I’m just finishing a book and it’s at the critical stage now where it’s the final editing and you’re 
focusing on every aspect of the book. I repeat myself and so I’m very aware of that and so my 
mind, on this Saturday mid-morning, was very much into the book and total focus, total 
concentration. And the phone went and this Indian-sounding chap said, oh it’s BT Openreach. 
We understand you’ve had some problems with your computer and, because you’re a loyal 
and long-standing customer, we’d like to try and resolve it for you. And I had had some 
problems with it, not important problems, irritations I suppose more than anything else. And 
because of where my head was, my whole attitude was, okay, it’s BT Openreach, yes, just get 
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on with it, just do it, fix it. I want to get back to the book. Nothing seemed unreasonable at 
that moment in time, because I was where my head was. Henry. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Godfrey was just in a hurry and about to go out, so rushed responding.  
 
And it was also, as I say, there was an element of hurry on me, at that moment.  So I probably 
didn’t think as clearly as I should have done. Godfrey. [Computer Virus, Individual].  
 
Victims with poor security habits  
Many of the victims, however, did reveal various poor security habits that were likely to make them a 
greater risk of victimisation.  
Passwords  
The breaching of passwords by offenders was a common issue in many of the hacking incidents. Some 
of the victims had weak passwords, some used the same for multiple accounts.  
I changed passwords once in a while. Probably not as much as I should have done. It’s the 
whole thing about don’t give your passwords to anyone else. But I was still in the fact that one 
password for one thing is the same for another. So if they knew the password for one thing 
they’d know the password for everything. Charlie. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
I had a strong password, but I had the same password for everything. Paul. (Hacking and Denial 
of Service Attack, Individual].  
 
I tend to use the same one across platforms because I’m 63 years old and I can’t remember 
any of them. Cameron. [Attempted hacking, Individual]. 
 
 
Some victims had simple guessable passwords:  
 
I’ve probably used about four passwords and haven’t really changed them.  I’ve only…I used 
to have one for business and one for personal.  And now I just change them to my kids’ names 
really.  But that was a bit…then I just changed it a bit more, but I haven’t really changed them 
and changed them and changed them and changed them.  We used to do that at college when 
I was teaching.  Every 30 days we use to have to do it. Catherine. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Liz kept a list of passwords on her laptop.  
But the problem being is that I never remember the passwords that I’ve put in. So, say, for 
instance... I’m just trying to think. Oh, I have a gardening account and obviously I’ve saved the 
password for that. And then if it came to my laptop was stolen and I needed to go into that 
account to reset the password, then I do have a list of passwords. Liz. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Anti-virus  
Several victims revealed they did not have any anti-virus software on their computers. Vanessa who 
had been the victim of malware revealed:  
So, like, the first one, the really serious one I had, was because I didn’t have anti-virus, so I 
didn’t have my Windows Defender, and I didn’t have anything like Avast, like, because it 
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wasn’t, like, familiar to me at this time that these were issues.  And then, I used a lot of sites 
where you can stream TV shows and stuff, that obviously are not good to use for your 
computer, which I can’t use on certain laptops. Vanessa. [Computer Virus, Individual].  
 
Ralph revealed the other business priorities of their organisation had led them not to keep anti-virus 
up-to-date.  
 
but because all the computers, they’re not the best computers in the world so the antivirus 
and that lot are not up to date, but it did give us a lot of struggle with that.  Because especially 
being a small theatre and we haven’t got the funds for the information technology so it was 
like, oh, we’ll put [inaudible 0:03:10] in. Ralph. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
Nigel had taken much interest and had just downloaded free software.  
 
I’d download things that were free on the computer and that was it really [before]. Nigel. 
[Ransomware, SME].  
 
Jing and Lily were both students who suffered from a computer virus, but provided different attitudes 
to anti-virus. Jing had had free anti-virus on her new laptop fitted, but had let expire at the end of that 
period. Lily had used free anti-virus. The incident had prompted Lily to pay for what she thought was 
better anti-virus, but Jing no change.   
 
Alex was dismissive of the benefits of anti-virus software.  
No, I don’t. And the reason for that is because from all the cursory research I’ve done there 
doesn’t seem to be evidence of them doing much more than warning you if you download 
something from a site, basically pestering you if you’re on an unfamiliar site, and it’s like well, 
I know I’m on an unfamiliar site, I know I’m being careful. So some of it was me feeling like I 
knew when I was at risk and being more careful. So a good example of this is if a site looks 
dodgy I won’t access it from my phone because the website can’t do much to my iPhone. It 
can’t really install anything. Whereas there are more vulnerabilities on PC. So I felt safer 
accessing something shady. Alex. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Risky behaviours  
Some victims revealed they engaged in risky behaviours that made victimisation more likely, such as 
going to illegal websites. Vanessa had regularly gone to unauthorised sites to watch movies and 
dramas:   
So, it was probably from any of the number of sites that I used to stream, like TV things on.  
Vanessa. [Computer Virus, Individual]. 
 
Lily also admitted this:  
 
Yeah.  I used to use those online movie websites and I think that that could have sparked a 
virus or a few viruses.  So I don’t use them, [or I try not to, 16:29] anymore.  Lily. [Computer 
Virus, Individual]. 
 
Lack of engagement with security standards for SMEs 
Of the SME/O victims interviewed [or responded in case of Mary] most did not work to any cyber 
security standards and even worse, many had not even heard of them. Mary reported both before 
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and after the incidents they were not working to any standards and simply had an information security 
strategy.  
I didn’t know about these Cyber Essentials. No, I don’t know about them, you’ve just told me. 
I’ll have to do some research about that. Ralph. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
Victims with good security habits  
It is also important to note that there were some victims who had very good security habits, but who 
still became victims. Alex worked in IT and had good knowledge of what good security was. After the 
first hack he had upped his security, including adding two-factor authentication to his account, but he 
was still hacked again.  
Yeah. It was clear that he was trying to get more information about me, but what was more 
scary was the fact that this was several months after the original incident and he was still kind 
of like a dog with a bone, and he had a kind of vendetta. This actually persisted into 2018, 
more than 12 months, when he was able to hack my PlayStation account again, despite having 
a lot of additional security lock downs put on it. Alex. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Arnold’s company contracted IT security to a good company working to ISO27001, but they still 
experienced a ransomware attack. Although the good quality security and procedures in place 
probably helped in responding to the incident so quickly and well. Jerry worked in IT had excellent 
knowledge of IT security:  
But it was clear someone had got into my account.  Now this is an account that, like most 
accounts, the log-in details are your email address and a password. All my passwords for every 
site I use are different, they're normally around a dozen characters long and alphanumeric 
and symbol strings.  And I use a piece of software to keep track because you can't remember 
it. And funnily enough, now Google does it for you, which is quite useful.  But I use different 
ones for every website so that if I ever get compromised, it only affects one site, unlike most 
people who use the same here, there and everywhere.  But it meant that the problem was 
limited.  Jerry. [Hacking, individual]  
 
He also used multiple anti-virus software packages, yet he was still a victim. Authur also had excellent 
knowledge and security and the attack happened because of factors beyond his control:  
 
Yeah.  I mean, all the servers had individual security packages on them; it was just a flaw in 
the operating system that they walked through.  So it didn’t matter what security packages 
you had on there because they literally had a back door and a key through the flaw in cPanel 
software.  Which cPanel won’t admit, but the fact that after I gave them the infected files, 
within a matter of hours there was X amount of updates done.  Basically, the updates were 
about a year’s worth of security updates. Authur. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Victims’ response to victimisation 
A common sense perspective would suggest that a person or organisation which is a victim of a CMC 
offences would seek to change security behaviours and the ways things are done to reduce the 
likelihood of them occurring again. Thus at the most obvious level a victim of a computer virus with 
no anti-virus software would acquire such software and someone who has been hacked would 
develop more complex passwords if they had been simple or compromised. The research has found 
that although this does happen, in many cases it does not. In fact the lack of engagement in changes 
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in behaviour and the way security is done in many cases was concerning bordering on worrying. This 
section will illustrate this though both the survey and interview data, using case studies from the 
latter. It will begin with the impact on security behaviours.    
 
Change in security behaviours  
Both the survey and interviews highlighted limited changes in security behaviours in general as a result 
of victimisation.  
Table 6.1. Survey respondents changes in security behaviours  
  Always undertake protective routines 
  Before After 
Use 
password/passcode/PIN 
to unlock smartphones 
or tablets. 
35.7% 49.6% 
Use a strong and 
separate password for 
main email account 
51.2% 45.6% 
Install the latest 
software and app 
updates once you notice 
that they are available 
35.7% 41.3% 
Turn on and use two-
factor authentication 
(2FA) for your main 
email account. 
34.5% 31.3% 
Back up your most 
important data 
24.2% 35.7% 
Never save passwords 
using a password 
manager on smartphone 
or tablet 
25.8% 13.5% 
Never save passwords 
for websites when given 
the option in the web 
browser. 
24.2% 13.1% 
Report any phishing 
emails by hitting the 
Spam or ‘report 
phishing’ button in your 
email account toolbar 
24.6% 34.9% 
    
    
  Usually (always or often) undertake protective 
routines 
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  Before After 
Use 
password/passcode/PIN 
to unlock smartphones 
or tablets. 
60.7% 74.2% 
Use a strong and 
separate password for 
main email account 
73.4% 70.2% 
Install the latest 
software and app 
updates once you notice 
that they are available 
63.1% 71.0% 
Turn on and use two-
factor authentication 
(2FA) for your main 
email account. 
64.7% 59.9% 
Back up your most 
important data 
46.4% 66.7% 
Never save passwords 
using a password 
manager on smartphone 
or tablet 
26.6% 23.8% 
Never save passwords 
for websites when given 
the option in the web 
browser. 
22.6% 20.2% 
Report any phishing 
emails by hitting the 
Spam or ‘report 
phishing’ button in your 
email account toolbar 
54.8% 57.9% 
 
The survey findings suggested:  
● Victimisation does not cause a major change in protective routines;    
● There is a small increase in use of device passcodes, software updates, data back-ups and 
reporting; and a decrease in the use of device and website password managers; and   
● There is no significant change in approach to protective authentication through strong 
passwords and 2FA for email accounts.      
 
The interviews revealed many examples of victims who barely or some cases did not enhance their 
security at all as a result of victimisation. This will be illustrated by some figures to illustrate some of 
these cases. There is not the space to consider all the victims, so some of the most salient examples 
will be considered.  
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Getsafeonline provides advice on preventing this type of incident by using the most up-to-date anti-
virus software. One would expect someone who is a victim of such an incident ideally to invest in such 
software. One might also expect the victim to look at websites offering advice and possibly to change 
behaviours if risky use of computer devices contributed. The following illustrate the different 
responses of victims to this type of incident. The first three in figure 6.1 show the contrasting 
responses of three victims who experienced computer viruses/malware. Jing did not change any 
behaviours, whereas Lily embarked upon a complete upgrade of her cyber security as did Vanessa. 
 
Figure 6.1. Computer virus/malware victims’ changes in behaviour compared 
 
Name  
 
Security Before  
 
 
Victimisation  
 
Response  
 
Security After 
 
Jing 
 
Poor security 
behaviours including 
no anti-virus.  
 
 
 
New laptop froze 
due to suspected 
virus at expiry of 
free anti-virus. 
Disruption to 
academic studies. 
 
 
Self-help did 
not consult 
any websites 
or seek formal 
help.  
 
No change. Still 
no anti-virus. No 
awareness of 
websites offering 
advice.  
 
 
Lily 
 
 
Medium security 
behaviours. Free anti-
virus and same 
passwords used.  
 
 
Contacted to say 
malware on 
computer which 
had hacked her 
webcam. This was 
false, but response 
triggered by this 
revealed viruses 
and malware on 
her laptop. 
 
 
Reported to 
Action Fraud, 
but no 
interest or 
support. 
Googled what 
should do and 
identified a 
variety of 
means to 
enhance 
security.  
 
Enhanced 
security, better 
anti-virus, use of 
2FA and 
awareness of 
websites offering 
advice. 
 
 
Vanessa 
 
 
Poor security 
behaviours including 
no anti-virus.  
 
 
Malware on her 
laptop redirecting 
her to porn sites.  
 
Housemate 
with IT 
knowledge 
helped clean 
laptop and 
offered 
advice.  
 
Wouldn’t use 
device unless anti-
virus. But no 
knowledge of 
websites offering 
advice.  
  
 
Ransomware, as a form of virus/malware, one would expect similar responses as above for computer 
viruses. The additional context of staff in SMEs one would also expect measures to promote awareness 
among them, where they are employed and may engage in behaviours putting the organisation at 
risk. The response of three SMEs is compared in figure 6.2.   
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Figure 6.2. Ransomware victims’ changes in behaviour compared 
 
 
Name  
 
Security Before  
 
 
Victimisation  
 
Response  
 
Security After 
  
Arnold  
 
Excellent security 
procedures and 
contracted company 
providing services 
working to ISO27001. 
 
Ransomware 
attack, all files 
encrypted of firm.  
 
IT staff with 
relevant 
knowledge 
dealt with 
incident.  
 
Excellent 
response, 
continued use of 
same company 
and anti-
virus/firewall 
updates checked 
more regularly. 
Raised awareness 
of issue with staff. 
 
Nigel  
 
Poor security, little 
knowledge and 
downloaded free anti-
virus 
 
Ransomware 
attack, all files 
encrypted 
 
Discussed 
with friend, 
police visit to 
take report 
and visit to PC 
World.  
 
Backing up of 
more data, return 
to paper systems. 
No knowledge of 
cyber security 
standards, 
websites offering 
support etc 
 
Ralph  
 
 
Basic security such as 
anti-virus, back ups.  
 
 
Ransomware 
attack, all files 
encrypted.  
 
Self-help 
based upon 
key member 
of staff’s 
knowledge on 
accessing 
backups to 
put back on 
computers.  
 
Manual checking 
of suspicious 
emails. No 
knowledge of 
websites offering 
support or any 
cyber security 
standards.  
 
 
 
In many cases the changes in security behaviour were very basic with changes of password and 
purchase of anti-virus software common. For many of the victims of hacking (non-banking) 
victimisation related to simple passwords or using the same password for multiple sites (one of which 
there had likely been a data breach). Catherine was an example of this and as the diagram shows there 
was still little change. However, her case was recent and she was receiving support from the police 
and a password manager was been considered. Angeline also provides another example illustrating 
little change. Paul provides an example of a better response to such an attack.  
Figure 6.3. Individual hacking victims’ changes in behaviour compared 
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Name  
 
Security Before  
 
 
Victimisation  
 
Response 
 
Security After 
 
Catherine 
  
 
Only two passwords 
used for all accounts.  
 
 
Victim of hacking 
of eBay and 
Facebook 
accounts.  
 
After 
reporting to 
Action Fraud 
police officer 
provided 
regular 
advice and 
support to 
enhance 
behaviours.  
 
More passwords 
used but still 
simple. No 
awareness of 
websites offering 
support.  
 
 
Angeline  
 
Basic security: device 
locking, anti-virus, 
some shared common 
passwords etc 
No knowledge of 
websites offering 
support.  
 
 
Facebook account 
hacked.  
 
Reported to 
Facebook 
and Action 
Fraud.  
 
No changes in 
security behaviour  
No knowledge or 
visits to websites 
offering support 
More cautious 
accepting friends 
on Facebook. 
 
Paul  
 
Poor security 
procedures, same 
simple passwords all 
accounts.  
 
 
Hacking of eBay 
and denial of 
service attack.  
 
Reported to 
eBay and 
Action Fraud 
– no help. 
Self-help to 
address 
security 
weaknesses.  
 
Closed email 
account. Varied 
passwords and 
two-factor 
authentication for 
some accounts. 
Limited awareness 
of support/advice.  
 
 
However, knowledge of let alone pursuit of relevant standards, including Cyber Essential was rare 
among the victims. Most pursued very limited responses to enhancing their cyber security after the 
incident. Kathy and Natalie who both ran SMEs instigated some changes, but had no knowledge of 
relevant standards and still had security gaps.  
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Figure 6.4. SME victims’ changes in behaviour compared 
 
 
Name  
 
Security Before  
 
 
Victimisation  
 
Response  
 
Security After 
 
Kathy   
 
 
Basic security 
procedures.  
 
Hacking of email 
account.  
 
 
Reported to 
Action Fraud 
(after 
contacting 
Citizen 
Advice) – no 
help. Self-
help to 
improve 
security.  
 
Changed 
passwords. 
Purchased more 
expensive anti-
virus (Kaspersky). 
Now aware of 
Action Fraud and 
Cyber Aware, but 
not any standards. 
 
 
Natalie  
 
 
Basic security 
procedures.  
 
Hacking of bank 
account. 
 
 
Self-help after 
reporting to 
bank.   
 
Dealing with 
incidents generally 
more 
professionally, 
reliance on 
daughter for cyber 
security. But still 
unsure of 
authenticity of 
websites, what a 
strong password is 
and cyber security 
standards. 
 
Some victims either had excellent security or enhanced their security but were still victims. Alex did 
enhance his security after the first incident, but even with more complex passwords and two-factor 
authentication he was still hacked again. Jerry worked in IT and had very sophisticated security, but 
was still hacked – probably as a result of a hack of the provider’s website or a corrupt insider revealing 
details.  
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Figure 6.5. Victims’ with excellent security 
 
Name  
 
Security Before  
 
 
Victimisation  
 
Response  
 
Security After 
 
Alex  
 
 
Very good knowledge 
of security, but not 
highest applied for 
passwords for 
Playstation as 
considered low risk 
 
Hacking of 
Playstation 
account and 
Twitter.  
 
Worked in IT 
and had good 
knowledge 
what to do to 
enhance 
security.  
 
 
More complex 
passwords and 
two-factor 
authentication, but 
still hacked again! 
 
Jerry  
 
 
Excellent security: 
complex and different 
passwords for every 
account, multiple paid 
for anti-virus, backing 
up and good 
knowledge. Awareness 
of multiple websites 
offering support and 
advice. 
 
 
Hacking of Ali 
Express account 
 
Worked in IT 
and had good 
knowledge 
what to do to 
enhance 
security.  
 
 
Same excellent 
security.  
 
The research also sought information on changes in behaviour beyond security. Both the survey and 
interviews found that victimisation did not generally lead to any significant change in behaviours.  
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Table 6.2. Survey respondents’ change in general behaviours as a result of victimisation  
  Change in 
protective 
behaviour 
    
  Significant 
increase 
Any increase 
(significant or 
small) 
No change or 
reduction 
Less use of device 13.5% 44.0% 54.8% 
Less use of 
internet 
10.7% 33.7% 65.1% 
Less use of social 
networking 
13.1% 33.3% 65.1% 
Less use of online 
banking 
6.7% 28.6% 69.4% 
Less online 
payments 
7.5% 32.1% 66.3% 
More interest in 
computer 
security 
13.1% 36.1% 62.7% 
     
Less trust in 
others 
15.1% 44.0% 54.0% 
 
The table shows:  
● The experience of harm is unlikely to lead to a significant increase in protective behaviours;  
● A minority of persons are more cautious;      
● The majority do not change their behaviour;      
● Most people who engage with the online world are resigned to the risks, pragmatically; and 
accepting the risks in exchange for the expediency of online services.    
  
Figure 6.6 illustrates examples of both positive and negative changes as a result of victimisation. 
However, as indicated above and will be developed more shortly the opportunity could have provided 
for even more significant positive changes in behaviour to enhance security.  
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Figure 6.6. Positive and negative changes as a result of victimisation 
 
Positive Changes 
 
 
Negative Changes 
 
 
Yeah, it’s made me more aware, or even more 
aware, of the importance of backups; because 
the biggest loss…I mean there’s a figure you can 
put on how many hours it took to deal with the 
situation, but the biggest loss, of course, would 
be loss of data, especially client data, and so it’s 
reminded me of the importance of keeping 
offline backups, whereby whatever happens, 
you always know you’ve got another copy. 
Steve. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
 
Everything is now passwords, two-step 
verifications. I’m kind of more aware of what I’ve 
logged into, because sometimes it’s easy just to 
log in to everything and never log out, especially 
on your phone and stuff, you just click it and it 
just comes up and you’re like, oh, I didn’t have 
to put my password in, so much of that. So I’m a 
lot more aware of what I’ve got that I 
automatically log in to and what I definitely log 
out of after each use, and the same with the 
desktop computer as well. Andrew. [Hacking, 
Individual]. 
 
I’m definitely more aware of not just flippantly 
clicking on what would be conceived as a dodgy 
website or one that’s not got the padlock on it 
or not secure. So yeah, it’s definitely changed 
that. That’s probably through both studying 
cybercrime and being a victim of computer 
misuse as well. Charlie. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Well, no, I ensure now, like I just recently 
purchased a new laptop and I made sure 
straightaway that I put the antivirus software on 
there. Gweneth. [Computer Virus, Individual].  
 
Oh, I’ve lost trust, yeah, yeah. I think it’s changed 
me, yeah...That people can do that, sort of, or 
that people can do that to somebody, I don’t 
know, I’m quite wary now, yeah. Claire. 
[Hacking, Individual].  
 
 
I’m still the same. Peter. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Yeah, it probably is the same but I really need 
to… I’m going to go home and just be on there 
all day now today just trying to work out my 
security. Ann. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
I’ve turned my computer on once since then.  
But it’s got three viruses on it which I haven’t 
had a chance to get rid of yet.  So I haven’t… 
Catherine. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
I didn’t do online banking for a little while.  I took 
in cash to pay for his after school fees and they 
said, oh, we don’t accept cash. Catherine. 
[Hacking, Individual]. 
 
Still zero interest in it [cyber security].  It’s not 
the most exciting subject. Paul. [Hacking and 
Denial of Service Attack, Individual].  
 
I just use it for writing letters or backing up my 
iPad. Since this has happened I don’t trust the 
computer, I don’t trust the antivirus to keep me 
safe, so I just leave it totally separate from the 
internet so whatever is stored there is there, if 
you know what I mean. Leo. [Hacking, 
individual].  
 
Yes.  The only thing I use now is Twitter.  But 
Facebook, all of that, it went straightaway.  Sam. 
[Hacking, individual].  
 
I have a Facebook account but it is locked down 
and private.  It has been [inaudible 0:51:42] I've 
got rid of a lot of people, [been a cull 0:51:49].  
You know, the [awful 0:51:51] thing is, that I've 
lived and worked all over the place and I've got 
great friends, and sometimes that connection 
is…you know, people do only use Facebook or…  
So I've been really active around saying, like, if 
you want to contact me, this is how we're going 
to do it, we're not going to do it through this 
channel, we'll do this.  All of my things like 
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Oh, my behaviour has definitely changed as a 
result. So, I am now much more savvy about 
authentication. I’m much more likely to report 
things now. And I’m much more likely to try and 
deter an attack of that sort happening, by having 
back-up systems and having an alternative. And 
that, you know, whether I’d use, like a, sort of, 
provider that could so easily be attacked. Again, 
I don’t know, maybe I would. Although to be fair 
to Google, they did stop it. Rachael. [Denial of 
Service Attack, Individual].  
 
Yeah.  I used to use those online movie websites 
and I think that that could have sparked a virus 
or a few viruses.  So I don’t use them, [or I try 
not to, 16:29] anymore.  Lily. [Computer Virus, 
Individual].  
 
 
 
Messenger are disabled so that you can't see 
when I'm online, because that became a way 
that they could track and monitor me. The same 
with WhatsApp, again, everything's disabled so 
you can't see when I'm online.  I'm not geo-
locatable. Anything I don't…everything is 
private. I have an Instagram account which, you 
know, a dozen people I know, really close 
friends.  You know, I think Twitter's a cesspit, 
Facebook less so but it's easier for people to get 
you.  I think Messenger is also very hackable by 
all accounts.  So I use something else, I use 
another system which is not Viber, it's [inaudible 
0:53:12] my brain's not working, sorry. Patricia. 
[Multiple, individual].  
 
 
 
The missed opportunity  
It was clear from the interviews that initial victimisation does stimulate an interest in cyber security 
and lead to some changes in what the victims do. Generally this point is very close to the immediate 
aftermath of the incident. However, at this point many victims do not receive suitable advice and 
support and do not access appropriate sources of advice, such as certain websites like the National 
Cyber Security Centre’s or Getsafeonline. Thus a victim of hacking who had a poor password should 
be exposed to advice on high quality passwords, using different passwords for different accounts, 
possible use of two-factor authentication and the use of password managers to name some at the 
point of reporting. In the immediate aftermath exposure to such advice might be more likely to yield 
more positive changes of behaviour.  
Unfortunately this moment of opportunity seems to be under-utilised. Many victims do not seem to 
be getting immediate advice, even if reporting to Action Fraud. Most victims do not seem to be going 
to the better quality websites to secure information or receiving quality advice. The initial spark of 
interest could be better exploited to get key messages to victims on enhancing their cyber security. 
Some victims do not change security behaviours at all, making further victimisation likely. Some only 
change a few minor areas related to the incident, such as most commonly for hacking victims changing 
passwords. The lack of knowledge of the Government’s Cyber Essentials and other related standards 
for SMEs was also concerning.  
It is also clear there are a plethora of websites offering advice. That victims because of the nature of 
victimisation are wary of websites. Finding advice and technical support is also a challenge as victims 
find it difficult to determine reputable providers and websites.  
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7. Reporting Computer Misuse Crime  
The report will now start to consider the response of relevant organisations to victims. This section 
will start to consider the reporting of CMC offences. It will first explore the reasons for low reporting 
before then examining their experience of reporting and then the response they received.  
Reasons for low reporting  
Earlier in this report the very high rates of attrition for computer misuse offences were illustrated. The 
reasons for individuals not reporting has been explored by the experimental statistics from the CSEW 
for year ending September 2016 were: they had not heard of Action Fraud at 66 percent (the same 
number for fraud offences too). Thereafter there are differences to fraud with too trivial at 12 percent 
(compared to 5 percent for fraud), 10 percent identified they dealt with the matter themselves 
(compared to 4 percent for fraud) and a variety of other responses in very small numbers (these 
questions have been recently revised).  
This research secured data from both the survey and the interviews. The four most common reasons 
among non-reporters in the survey were:  
● 43.3% not having heard of Action Fraud or not realising they dealt with computer misuse 
related crime;  
● 43.3% dealt with the matter themselves;  
● 19.2% by the belief the police wouldn’t do anything; and 
● 18.3% No loss or small loss/felt too trivial/attempt unsuccessful.  
A variety of other reasons were noted and the interviews also echoed these key findings among 
others. The reasons uncovered from the interviews will now be explored.  
Status of computer misuse related crime  
The starting point for considering CMC is more ambiguous than traditional volume crimes like 
burglary. These new crimes are not always considered clearly as crimes and there is more uncertainty 
over their status, particularly where there is no financial loss and for computer virus related offences. 
The comments of Gweneth and Jing illustrate this:  
 
Well, as far as I know, I don't believe a criminal offence against myself has taken place, I'm not 
aware of any...if my details have been cloned or anything like that because the work on my 
computer here just generally tends to be my academic work. Gweneth [Computer virus, 
individual].  
 
I didn’t know this, that it’s some criminal case that I can report. Jing [Computer Virus, 
individual].  
 
There was no financial loss 
Linked to the status is the issue of financial loss and many incidents do not involve loss, leading to less 
interest in reporting:  
No, there was no loss involved, ‘cause I was just ahead of the game you might say…I  
don’t know what the police could do in cases like this anyway, between you and me,  
what are they going to do?  I mean the guy was probably from the Far East, not in this  
country. Harold [Hacking, individual].  
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Oliver also noted this:   
 
So I mean because I didn't hand over my information, I didn't hand over any of my credit card 
details, I gave them nothing, I didn't report it because I just thought well there's not really 
much they're going to be able to do, I don't want to waste their time. Oliver. [Computer virus, 
individual].  
 
Assumption non-police/Action Fraud initial reporting body would pass on  
Lots of the victims who did not report to the police/Action Fraud, did report to the relevant service 
provider. Many of these felt no further action was required if their situation was resolved. Some also  
assumed the body they were reporting to would pass on to Action Fraud:  
Because they said they’d pass it on. They said they’d keep the incident and if it amounts to 
anything then they’ll pass it on to the police, but I never heard anything after. Charlie [Hacking, 
individual].  
 
Yeah I mean it's something that we discussed as a leadership team and whether or not there 
was a mechanism in order for us to do so.  So we went back through our academy chain and 
had a discussion and we've reached the point where they essentially said, if the council have 
said they're doing it, let the council deal with it.  But certainly we had discussions around the 
table as a leadership team to say, what can we do in terms of raising it and the answer back 
from the academy saying don't do anything.  Guy. [DDoS, SMO].  
 
In Benjamin’s case the incident had been successfully resolved by the bank, so he did not feel the need 
to report to the police or Action Fraud:  
But given that we’d been compensated within, I don’t know, three or four days, I think, we 
were happy just to get the money and carry on with our lives. Benjamin [Hacking, individual].  
 
Some victims were able to resolve the situation themselves so felt no need to report and seek any 
further help:  
I think it’s because I resolved it myself, I was happy with the outcome, that they’d locked it 
out, that we updated my details and put in the two-step verification thing, they’d explained 
some more kind of things about security and stuff and changing my password, and the fact 
that this person no longer had access. That was the main thing. It was kind of like it was 
resolved, so that was nice. Andrew [Hacking, individual].  
 
Reputation and experience of Action Fraud 
The reputation of Action Fraud and past experience was a reason identified by some victims:  
all people say about Action Fraud is that it’s an easy way for the police to get rid of a 
troublesome complainant, so they give you a website.  You go to the website.  You fill out this 
online form and they give you a number, and you get a generic reply.  And you really don’t 
hear anything more. I mean I appreciate the volume of what they must be dealing with.  But 
you feel that it’s a bit of a black hole really. Steve. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
This is what Rachael thought too:  
…I have reported a different thing to Action Fraud, which is next to useless. I mean, it’s worse 
than useless, it’s a waste of your time, for literally nothing. That was a completely different 
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incident that I’ve reported to them, where somebody was checking into a hotel in my name, 
and I was getting things and they were, like…we rang…we actually rang the hotel and they 
were, like, they’ve checked in. And I was, like, well go and get them, these people are 
fraudsters, but Action Fraud did absolutely nothing about it. But no…the 2017 attack no, I 
didn’t report it to Action Fraud. Rachael. [Denial of Service Attack, Individual]. 
 
One victim who experienced an ongoing incident that lasted over a year in the initial phase had not 
only reported to the local police, but also the police where he thought the offender lived. He had also 
reported to Action Fraud, who had told him to dial 101 and report to the police. As his hometown 
police had shown no interest, when there was an incident again a year later involving the same 
offender he had just reported it to Playstation and hadn’t bothered with the police or Action Fraud. 
As Alex noted in relation to Action Fraud:  
 
I got a reply but it was an annoying reply. Action Fraud actually recommended that I dial 101, 
which is basically they’ve told me to contact the police, and it’s like well, I did that and they 
told me to contact you guys. Alex [Hacking, individual].  
 
Lily had received a scam extortion mail which claimed there was malware on her computer, which 
Action Fraud had rejected as a crime and so when she did discover extensive malware on her computer 
she didn’t bother reporting:  
 
I didn’t report them to Action Fraud because they didn’t do anything the first time I tried to 
report the incident so I didn’t believe that they would do anything. Also, the anti virus removes 
all threats so the problem was dealt with. Lily (Computer Virus, individual)  
 
The police are unlikely to do anything because they are too busy 
Some victims thought the police were very busy dealing with more serious crime and thought it would 
be unlikely they would be able to do anything. Perceptions of police capacity as being low in this area 
were a common theme in the interviews and a perception they do not have much in this area in terms 
of both resources and capability (this issue will be developed in more depth later).  
Purely because I thought I was one of so many victims that… a) it was known about, because 
it was being talked about on various websites and news reports and what have you, and I 
didn’t think I was going to get any response worthy of my time in reporting it really. Steve 
[Ransomware, SME].  
 
Jackie, who was a serving police officer, also highlighted this reason:  
Thing is, I know how limited that would get…I mean, certainly from a local force, there’s 
limited that would get done and I’m aware that…I mean, Action Fraud, yes, but yeah, I’m very 
time poor at the moment – well, especially at the time of it happening [inaudible 04:12] 
building works and got two young kids so, yeah, I didn’t…it took up more of my time which I 
didn’t really have.  Now I’m a bit more flush for time but the moment has passed. Jackie. 
[Hacking, individual].  
 
Wrongly advised it was not a crime 
Some victims did try to report, but were advised it was not a crime. Husksy, whose laptop was hacked 
by her estranged husband was told it was not a crime:  
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And he [the police officer] said, you are married, so if you leave it [the laptop] on the table, 
he’s got access.  But obviously there was a big misunderstanding, because it doesn’t matter 
where I leave my computer, the point is that when I am online, I could be in a different 
country, but if I’m online, he can see that I’m online, and he can see what I’m doing, what I’m 
not doing. Husky [Hacking, individual].  
Sam who had experienced her laptop been hacked used to take pictures of her and then threatened 
with public exposure unless she paid a ransom was also wrongly advised it was not a crime:  
I was informed that there was nothing I could do. Apart from block the emails, cover my 
webcam and not part with money. 
 
She went on:  
…I tried printing them out and taking them in, but they just kind of disregarded what I was 
trying to say. It was almost like they were thinking, oh, this is just a friend who's being funny.  
But I'm like, no, this is actually someone who I don't know who's causing me real problems. 
And even if it was a friend, that's still not right. Sam. [Hacking, individual].  
Never heard of Action Fraud  
The interviews also highlighted the recurring theme of lack of knowledge of Action Fraud:  
I have no idea what Action Fraud even is. Vanessa [Computer virus, individual].  
 
I didn’t know them. Nigel. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
(heard of Action Fraud) No, I haven't. Gweneth. [Computer virus, Individual].  
 
I didn’t really know about Action Fraud at the time. I wasn’t really aware of it. I didn’t think it 
was serious enough for the police, I didn’t want to bother the police with it. Charlie [Hacking, 
individual].   
 
I didn’t know Action Fraud was a thing, until you just said it.  So, there’s a problem.  I don’t 
know it’s there.  Sabrina. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Another reason linked to this cited was that victims did not realise Action Fraud dealt with cybercrime:  
 
I didn’t really consider it a fraud.  I’m aware now, obviously, that Action Fraud deals with cyber, 
like, computer misuse stuff, but I think the name Action Fraud is a bit misleading. James 
[Hacking, individual].   
 
Embarrassment and fear of the consequences of reporting 
Embarrassment and fear of the consequences of reporting was noted by a very small number of 
victims:  
Maybe I was too embarrassed to report it, you don’t know. Harold [Hacking, individual]. 
 
For one victim the reason for non-reporting (later when she realised initial advice was wrong) was the 
fear of the consequences of reporting because the offender was her ex-husband and the possible 
conviction might further impact upon her children, who had already been hurt by the divorce:  
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I am, and not only for that, my consideration is now, I have two almost adult children, and if 
my actions are actually going to be looked at, and their father gets some sort of attention, I 
need to consider the consequences on them.  Because they already had quite a hard time 
during the divorce, ‘cause he was really horrible.  And what could be the results, and what 
could be the commotion of it?  I don’t think they want more attention, whether it is from the 
police, or from any other legal sort of body around, I don’t know, I can always make an enquiry, 
if they don’t have all my details, there is so much they can do. Husky [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Jing was also concerned if she reported the incident that she may lose her laptop for a period of time 
which was crucial to her studies:  
Yeah. I did, I [inaudible 0:06:50] because I’m not sure what were the [insurance 0:06:54] on 
my laptops because as student I need to finish up my dissertations and all that. So I might be 
worried that if they would take away my laptop, so I might have some difficulties in completing 
my research. Jing. [Computer Virus, Individual].  
 
Another factor for Oliver was fear of potential consequences of drawing attention to himself as he 
was just about to emigrate to the USA:  
 
Yeah, but this was around the time I was moving to the United States, I thought I don't want 
to draw attention to anything [inaudible 11:42], on their computer systems, given everything 
that had been going on in the press and whatnot.  Yeah I [inaudible 11:55] as it was.  I just put 
it down to [potential 11:59], virus that could have been on the computer that may well have 
just been laying dormant on the USB. 
Other factors discouraging reporting to the police/Action Fraud 
The interviews also provided leads to explore some other issues which also contributed to non-
reporting by victims.  
Other websites where CMC is reported 
Many victims go to the service provider where the incident has occurred in the first place. Thus a 
person whose Facebook account is hacked, reports to them. An assessment was also undertaken by 
the authors of 39 websites where hacking is common, which showed many websites where initial 
reports might be made, yet do not mention Action Fraud or describe such behaviours as crimes. The 
assessment included banks, online gaming providers, social networking sites, email providers and 
online shopping providers. Only 4 of these specifically mention reporting to Action Fraud and in some 
of these it relates to fraud, rather than computer misuse offences. Most focus upon their own 
procedures for rectifying a hacked account, some offer further advice on prevention. Treating the 
incident as a crime or mentioning Action Fraud are rarely mentioned. However, it is important to note 
this was an assessment of the public reporting websites and providers, once receiving a report, may 
offer advice to report to the police or Action Fraud. Indeed the interviews revealed evidence of some 
victims being advised by such providers once they had reported to also report to Action Fraud. 
Nevertheless it would seem that many of the first places victim go to do not mention or encourage 
reporting the incident as a crime. Appendix 3 provides two examples of this.  
Action Fraud website  
A number of other factors were noted as discouraging the reporting of CMC to the police/Action Fraud 
were noted from the authors’ assessments and some comments from victims. The name ‘Action 
Fraud’ is clearly a first barrier as it implies a website for fraud, not cyber- crime and this was an issue 
also noted by some victims. The authors’ assessment also noted beneath Action Fraud on the main 
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website there is ‘National Fraud & Cyber Crime Reporting Centre’, but this is in very small font. Across 
the top of the website clicking on reporting reveals only report a fraud or phishing attempt with no 
mention of other cybercrimes. The A-Z of frauds covers some CMC offences, but unlike most fraud 
offences there is not a link at the bottom to report fraud. Overall the impression from the Action Fraud 
website is of one focused upon fraud, not the broader cybercrime offences. Appendix 4 illustrates 
these issues.  
Police reporting websites  
The interviews with victims suggested some confusion on who cybercrime should be reported to, with 
some been wrongly advised. One would expect victims who try to report to the police to be directed 
towards Action Fraud. The research team did not have the time to review all police websites, but a 
snapshot revealed some issues which may discourage reporting. Take the example of the West 
Yorkshire Police. The reporting page has no mention of any cybercrime (or fraud!). Clicking on 
reporting something else, also fails to lead to any links for cybercrime (or fraud). In another example 
from Surrey Police, the main reporting website mentions fraud (but does not direct to Action Fraud), 
yet not cybercrime. A better example of reporting was Dorset police, which more clearly illustrated 
where cybercrime should be reported on their website. See Appendix 5 for examples.  
 
Reporting Experience of those Reporting to Bodies other than Police/Action Fraud 
Among the survey respondents 56.7% (n=143) reported the incident to a body other than the police 
or Action Fraud. The most common body to report to, accounting for a quarter, was a bank or financial 
institution, followed by just under a fifth to a social networking site. Employers came in for 16.9% of 
reports, email providers 14.1% and internet providers 11.6%.   Six of the interviewees had reported to 
such a body alone and there were a number of others who had reported to such a body and the 
police/Action Fraud.  
Button et al (2011) found many fraud victims sent on a merry-go-round not knowing who to report to 
and sent from one agency to the next. Victims of computer misuse, particularly those who have had 
an account hacked generally have a clearer pathway to reporting. There were very few that started 
from a point of not knowing who to report to. Kathy who ran a small plumbing/central heating 
business with her husband had experienced a hack of her email where the offender had written to 
clients to notify them of a change of bank account for payments. She was unsure of what to do and so 
went to Citizen Advice and she was not impressed:  
And she basically said it’s your fault, it’s your responsibility, you have to refund your client. So 
I was like, wow, I’ve just had my hands slapped. Kathy. [Hacking, SME].  
 
However, Kathy was unusual as she did not know know who to report to. For some the only short 
inconvenience was contacting the police and then been told to go to Action Fraud. Before that stage, 
however, for most hacking victims the first organisation they consider – if they are going to report – 
is the relevant service provider. For example a person who thinks their bank account has been hacked, 
contacts the bank; an individual whose Facebook account has been compromised contacts them. For 
computer virus and ransomware victims there is not always a service provider or employer that has 
any responsibility for the device, meaning there is no body to report to other than police or Action 
Fraud.  
As was noted earlier the information provided by such service providers does vary, with some not 
providing a clear website page identifying what the victim should do. Some only offer online means of 
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reporting, when the victim might prefer to talk to someone. The first challenge for victims is therefore 
to find the relevant guidance on how to report the incident and what to do.  The nature of the 
victimisation means some victims prefer to want to speak to someone, but often the initial reporting 
mechanisms do not allow for that. For example, Ann experienced challenges with eBay:  
Not that easy really; trying to find out how you kind of went about it. I think we were going 
through two or three different sites and she was saying, well, maybe, you know, this is where 
we need to go. And I think that’s why we tried to get in contact with eBay, but obviously that’s 
quite a hard thing to do in itself. Ann. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
The victims who had experienced a hack of their bank account were generally all very positive about 
their reporting experience to banks. They could contact by telephone in a reasonable period of time, 
their issue was dealt with and they were also usually offered instant advice on dealing with the 
situation and enhancing their security.  
Yes, they couldn’t be more helpful, understanding. I mean, I was feeling such a prat at the 
time, but they were kind, considerate, got straight on with it. Told me what they had done, 
what I now had to do and what the process would be to reopen the accounts again. Henry. 
[Hacking, Individual].  
 
The experience of victims relating to organisations other than banks, however, was much more mixed, 
with more negative experiences:  
Then around PayPal, PayPal were useless because they said they couldn’t see the transactions.  
They just seen it’s been done as a guest.  Catherine. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Facebook have been useless. Catherine. [Hacking, Individual]. 
 
 
Some did experience positive outcomes, however:  
Well, they…I suppose they did their job at the end of the day in getting me the money back 
on it, but I think they really just kind of like passed me onto somebody else. Ann. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
I realised what was going on. I immediately phoned up the customer service department at 
Apple, who were absolutely fantastic. They passed me through to the fraud department with 
them, because as she didn’t have my password they classed it as fraud. And we set up two 
forms of ID so only my phone and iPad actually link to my account now, and if anybody logs in 
I get a text message straight away and an email to say someone’s attempting to log in, and it 
gives me a unique security number just for that incident so nobody else can actually get in. 
Yet – but I daresay there will be ways round it in the future. Leo [Hacking, individual].   
 
Experience of Victims whose cases were reported to the Police and/or Action Fraud  
Drawing on the interviews with victims and the survey of 252 victims the following section will 
illustrate their experience of reporting. It is also important to remember the caveats noted in section 
3, particularly the methods used to identify the victims means they may not be representative of all 
victims. The victims who reported to the police and/or Action Fraud are listed in table 7.1 below and 
the means by which they reported identified.  
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Table 7.1. Victims’ means of reporting to police and/or Action Fraud  
 
Name of Victim 
 
 
The Police  
 
Action Fraud  
Ralph  Telephone (999)  
Henry  Online  
Nigel In person (visit)  
Sabrina  Telephone (101)  
Peter  Online  
Bernard Telephone (101) Telephone  
Kathy  Online  Online  
Hilda (Via Adrian) Telephone (101) Telephone  
Ann  Telephone  
Lizz  Could not recall 
Alex Telephone (101) (and 
police force where 
offender through to 
live) 
Online  
Claire  Telephone (101) (After 
Action Fraud) 
Telephone  
Justin  Online  
Aliya   Online  
Sophie  Telephone (poor 
recall) 
Online (poor recall)  
Cameron  Online  
Caroline   Telephone  
Catherine  Telephone (101) Telephone  
Husky  In person (police 
station) 
 
Terry Telephone (101) Telephone  
Sarah  Telephone (101)  
Angeline   Website 
Arnold  Telephone (poor 
recall, not certain) 
 
Godfrey   Website (poor recall, 
not certain) 
Paul   Telephone  
Natalie NCA contacted her 
after report to bank 
 
Lily   Website  
Joana   Website  
Patricia  Multiple reports Multiple reports 
Wayne Telephone (101) Telephone  
Benjamin NCA contacted him 
after report to bank 
 
Mark  Telephone (101)  
Leo In person  Website 
Mathew  Telephone  
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Michael  Could not recall 
Kate Website  
Jerry  Telephone  
Sam  Telephone (101), 
website and in person 
 
Authur Contacts Telephone 
Kellie Telephone (101)  
 
The victims provided a wide mix of means of contact covering both police and/or Action Fraud via the 
relevant websites, telephone and in person. Some of their experience is highlighted below.  
Reporting experience of those reporting to the police  
Victims of CMC offences should in most cases report to Action Fraud. The motivations of victims 
reporting to the police included not knowing about Action Fraud and thus going to the police in the 
first instance and been told to report to Action Fraud or directly transferred. Some victims also wanted 
to report to the police and Action Fraud. There is also the added complexity that some cybercrimes 
should be reported to the police in the first instance, such as those involving harassment.   
The survey data found 29.8% (n=75) of victims reporting to the police and the most popular means 
been by telephoning 9993 (36% of police reports), followed by dialling 101 (22.7% of police reports), 
website (21.3%) and in person (18.7%). The survey found vis-à-vis police reporting, some of the 
following key findings:    
● The police dealt with 9% (7) of cases as a matter of urgency;    
● A total of 93% (70) of cases reported to the police were subsequently reported to Action 
Fraud, including 7% (5) that were urgent cases handled immediately by the police;  
● 3% (2) were treated as urgent but were not reported to Action Fraud or any other body;  
● 3% (2) were not taken seriously and not reported to Action Fraud or any other body; and 
● 12% (9) of those who reported directly to the police received protection advice from the 
police, compared to 42% of those who reported through Action Fraud. 
    
The survey also sought data from the victims rating their experience of dealing with the police.  This 
revealed:  
● Overall 67% of victims who reported to the police were satisfied (strongly or tend to agree) 
with the experience;    
● But it could be improved as 33% were not positively satisfied and only 23% were very satisfied;
  
● The reporting process worked well enough for most victims, 69% finding it easy enough 
(strongly agree or tend to agree) to report crimes;    
● But it could be improved as only 35% found it very easy;    
● Most victims (65%) felt the police staff were knowledgeable;    
● But there is room for improvement as 35% were not positive about the officers' knowledge 
and only 28% felt the police were very well informed;    
● 69% of the victims felt more confident in the police following their experiences with the police;
  
                                                          
3 999 should only be used for reporting an emergency or crime in progress, not for typical cyber-crimes which 
have already occurred.  
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● But the confidence of 31% was not improved, and only 33% were much more confident  
● Contact with the police has increased most (68%) victims' risk awareness;   
● Most victims (68%) feel more equipped to protect themselves as a result of the support 
provided by the police; and    
● However, this does not translate well into more protective routines and more cautious online 
practices.    
 
Most victims reporting to the police described the process as a positive experience. There were, 
however, a few victims who described a negative experience. Husky and Sam were both wrongly 
advised they could not report the incident:  
And he said, you are married, so if you leave it on the table, he’s got access.  But obviously 
there was a big misunderstanding, because it doesn’t matter where I leave my computer, the 
point is that when I am online, I could be in a different country, but if I’m online, he can see 
that I’m online, and he can see what I’m doing, what I’m not doing. Husky. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
Sam also experienced this in relation to her attempt to report someone hacking her webcam and 
attempting to blackmail her:   
I know, my husband was more shocked being a retired police officer himself and still being 
involved with the RTC side of policing (fair to say he was not impressed) at first I spoke to 101 
who told me to use their online forms to log a complaint, I did so and never heard back from 
them. I phoned again and was told someone would phone me back, again no phone call, for 
the third time my husband took me to the station and we spoke to someone on the desk. After 
what felt like a very brief discussion with an officer, I was informed that there was nothing I 
could do. Apart from block the emails, cover my webcam and not part with money. Sam. 
[Hacking, individual].  
 
Patricia, whose case was very complex experienced many challenges because of multiple police forces 
been involved been passed from force to force:  
 
And it really is luck of the draw. And some offences were being committed in different 
territories, and the disparity between different police forces is huge.  So the Met deal with it 
one way, Kent Police barely dealt with it at all.  Exeter Police were very good when it involved 
lawyers, and they were creating gay sexual images of our solicitors. And Exeter Police, the 
Devon Police were very, very good and they were very together.  The Welsh Police were very 
together, Lancashire Police were together.  The Met were pretty hopeless.  Luton were okay 
up until a point…  Patricia. [Multiple, Individual].  
 
Experience of those Reporting to Action Fraud  
The survey data found 48% (n=120) of respondents had reported to Action Fraud or someone had 
reported on their behalf. It also found just over three quarters found Action Fraud via the police or 
another organisation advising them. The survey found regarding their experience (see Appendix 3):  
 Overall 68% of victims who reported to Action Fraud were satisfied (strongly or tend to agree) 
with the experience;    
 But it could be improved as 32% were not positively satisfied and only 29% were very satisfied;
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 The reporting process worked well enough for most victims, 80% finding it easy enough 
(strongly agree or tend to agree) to report crimes [better than the police];   
 But it could be improved as only 37% found it very easy [same as police];   
 Most victims (75%) felt the Action Fraud advisors were knowledgeable [a little better than the 
police ];     
 But there is room for improvement as 25% were not positive about the advisors' knowledge 
and only 33% felt the advisors were very well informed [a little better than the police]; 
 70% of the victims felt more confident in the police following their experiences with Action 
Fraud [same as police];    
 But the confidence of 30% was not improved, and only 30% were much more confident [same 
as police]; and      
 Contact with Action Fraud has increased most (70%) victims' risk awareness [similar to police]. 
    
    
The interviews confirmed this as many of the victims at the point of victimisation had not heard of 
Action Fraud. Only via their own research, advice from another report receiving organisation or by 
going to the police first did many of the victims come to Action Fraud. As the section above illustrated 
and as this section will show the name and online information does not clearly direct victims of CM 
offences to Action Fraud, unless there is a fraud element to the offence:  
I think it was one of the banks that said, well you need to use Action Fraud. That was it. Henry. 
[Hacking, Individual].  
 
I don’t remember if I had heard of it or I looked it up and found it. Action Fraud is, kind of, the 
branding of it. I don’t know. I think I was aware that there was somewhere to report and so I 
did. Cameron. [Attempted Hacking, Individual].  
 
I think I just looked it up on the internet, I put in spam emails, or something, and then it came 
up you should report to Action Fraud, but I don’t know the proper procedure really of how to 
do it, I’m just, sort of, guessing. Peter. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Justin did some research to identify who to report to, but his management were still not convinced.  
I remember a conversation with the assistant headteacher as well, who was my line manager 
at the time. So, she said, but it's not fraud. You know, this is who have been told to report it 
to. So, I think, yeah, perhaps the name is a bit misleading. Justin. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Alex who had started with the police and was told to contact Action Fraud, was actually told to report 
to the police, when he did contact Action Fraud:  
I got a reply but it was an annoying reply. Action Fraud actually recommended that I dial 101, 
which is basically they’ve told me to contact the police, and it’s like well, I did that and they 
told me to contact you guys. Then I got no reply from my message saying… Alex. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
The survey found 41% reported by the website and 39% by telephone. The experience from the 
interviews relating to the two forms of reporting will now be assessed.   
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Telephone line experience  
Those reporting to Action Fraud via the telephone generally had a positive experience:  
I think at the time I found it, you know, they were really helpful. They just asked the different 
bits, you know, that I told you. A minute probably would have been 20 minutes, half an hour, 
but it didn’t worry me because I thought I’m telling them what happened. Caroline. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
They were really good. They were probably on about…two hours on the phone to them.  They 
were really good. Catherine. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
They are very reassuring. I mean, when you feel…you feel you’re talking to determined people 
but they’re pretty helpless, actually. There isn’t much they can do, I think. Bernard. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
In terms of logging it, they were probably quite helpful, like…they didn’t make any false 
promises or anything like that.  You know, sometimes they might have said, like, oh we’ll 
promise we get you?  They didn’t say any of that.  They were just quite factual.  In terms of 
what they actually told me, I can’t remember word for word, what they said. Paul. [Hacking 
and Denial of Service Attack, Individual].  
 
 
Authur, however, was critical of their knowledge:  
They haven’t got a clue.  They’re literally just call handlers. Authur. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Website experience  
The experience of reporting via the website was much more mixed with some positive, but some very 
negative. A number of negative experiences noted the process was such they were tempted to give 
up.4  
It’s pages and pages and pages of stuff that you’re relevant to reporting what I had and it took 
forever. It took, I don’t know how long, 45 minutes or something. Cameron. [Attempted 
Hacking, Individual].  
 
Yeah, I used their website, and I filled the form in, I remember, it took quite a while; and then 
somebody contacted me, and I sent them all the communications. Aliya. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
Action Fraud’s website is awful as well. It felt like I was submitting to something from the 
1990s. I don’t know how they managed to make a website that looked so archaic. It takes 
some skill. It’s incredible. Alex. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
 
However, some victims were positive about the website reporting experience:  
 
It was quite easy.  I just had to state when it happened, what happened and I had to write a 
little paragraph about it and tell them any steps I had taken so far and stuff like that.  It was 
quite easy. Lily. [Computer Virus, Individual].  
 
                                                          
4 The website has changed and most victims had reported under the old website.  
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Pretty easy to do. I’m actually dyslexic and their website I could manage it. My spelling was 
atrocious, don’t get me wrong. But I did phone them up after I reported it and asked for their 
advice what to do and they told me to take it to the local police as well because I’ve actually 
got a confirmation address with one of the emails from Apple of where they’d logged in from. 
Leo. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
 
Husky had not reported it, but had used the web chat facility, which she was positive about:  
 
And I only recently, I have had this online, there is a chat facility on the Action Fraud website, 
and I just said, out of curiosity, is this considered a crime, because the police told me that it 
wasn’t, and he said, no matter what is your relationship with a person, if you don’t give 
permission for somebody to access your computer, it is illegal.  He said, you need to send it in 
to us, to be considered, and then we’ll decide whether to take action or not. Husky. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
8. The Response of the Police/Action Fraud  
 
Once a victim has successfully reported a case of CM one can imagine an ideal response for a victim 
might be: the immediate needs are satisfied relating to technical support, relevant guidance on 
prevention and dealing with the incident, emotional support etc. Information is provided on the 
progress of the case. That action is pursued to prevent more of these types of incidents. Most victims 
are also likely to want a police response involving an investigation, identification of an offender and 
successful prosecution. The latter given the size of the problem of this type of crime is very unlikely. 
The survey provided some interesting data on what support reporters to Action Fraud actually 
received.  
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Table 8.1. Survey data on what happened to victims who reported to Action Fraud 
 
 Count (Yes) % of victims 
reporting to 
Action Fraud  
Received 
meaningful 
updates from 
either Action 
Fraud or the 
police regarding 
what was 
happening with 
my report 
47 39.2% 
Received regular 
updates from 
either Action 
Fraud or the 
police regarding 
what was 
happening with 
my report 
40 33.3% 
Received 
information via 
email or 
telephone on 
how to protect 
against becoming 
a victim of 
cybercrime again 
35 29.2% 
A police or 
community 
support officer 
visited me in 
person to provide 
information on 
how to protect 
against becoming 
a victim of 
cybercrime again 
18 15.0% 
Received 
information that 
a police 
investigation 
would not be 
happening 
11 9.2% 
Received 
information that 
a police 
investigation was 
5 4.2% 
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being made into 
the incident 
Received 
information on 
the final outcome 
of the police 
investigation 
8 6.7% 
Advised that the 
incident would be 
recorded by a 
financial 
institution and no 
further action 
required 
8 6.7% 
Advised that the 
incident was not 
being recorded as 
a crime 
7 5.8% 
Other [please 
specify] 
1 0.8% 
None of the 
above 
2 1.7% 
Tot 182 151.7% 
n 120  
 
Some of the key findings from this table illustrates are as follows. Of those victims who reported to 
Action Fraud (n=120):  
 
● Less than 40% (47) felt they received meaningful updates about what was happening with 
their report;  
● Only about 1/3rd (40) received regular updates or advice about protection from Action Fraud 
about what was happening with their report ;    
● Only 15% (18) of those reporting to Action Fraud were visited by the police service;  
● Only 7% received a report on the final police outcome;  
● Overall 42% (50) received protection advice as a result of their Action Fraud report, compared 
to 12% of those who reported only to the police; 
● 29% (35) received advice by email or telephone about how to protect against becoming a 
victim of cyber crime again;    
● 15% (18) subsequently received advice from a police or community support officer; and  
● 3% (3) received advice through both routes.    
   
Some of these issues will now be developed in more depth using the interview data along with some 
other related issues that arose from it.  
 
Disappointment at Action Fraud classification  
Some victims are disappointed at the classification of their incident not as a crime. For Aliya her case 
was classified as civil, which she could not understand:  
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They said civil, this is a civil case; and I said, okay, I mean I already did that. But I mean why 
must one go and do that instead of stopping the perpetrator; I just felt that the person who 
was dealing with my case wasn’t experienced in the online world, and they couldn’t 
understand the consequences of letting someone like that loose on the public and making lots 
of money feeding off people. Aliya. [Ransomware, SME].  
Lily was also disappointed:  
 
They emailed me back saying that they was closing the case.  They weren’t going to investigate 
the case because apparently it wasn’t a crime. Lily. [Computer Virus, Individual]. 
This made her:  
  Like, disheartened ‘cause I think it is a crime.  Lily. [Computer Virus, Individual].  
 
Frustration at perceived lack of action  
For most of the victims who did report to Action Fraud/Police the case was accepted. However, for 
some of these there was a perceived lack of action.  
 
Lack of any response  
For Henry, he had not even received an email or letter from Action Fraud after reporting the incident, 
relating to his case. Bernard could not recall if he had, but his memory was not brilliant:  
 
No, I don’t remember. Gosh, I’m sorry I just can’t remember whether I got a letter. Bernard. 
[Hacking, Individual].  
 
Ann could also not recall:  
 
I don’t remember getting a letter, I may have got an email from them just saying, you know, 
that they were dealing with it, but I don’t remember getting a letter at all. Ann. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
Response to say no further action  
Most victims who reported, however, did receive a letter/email, but stating there will be no further 
action relating to the case. Kathy also commented on this:  
 
Yes. I still did it [report to Action Fraud] straight away. I didn’t get any help from anybody. 
They basically said, you know, great, thanks for letting us know and we’ll look into it. And that 
was it. I didn’t know if they meant they’d look into our case or, you know, it’s something we’re 
looking into. Kathy. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Lack of information on progress of the case 
Some victims were frustrated at not hearing information on any progress in their case. Caroline felt 
there should be more information on the progress of the case provided:  
 
I thought it would have been nice to hear a bit more but, you know, they probably could have 
just traced it to them, it’s a dead end. I always think it’s always nice to hear an outcome or 
follow up of something. Caroline. [Hacking, Individual].  
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Advice and support received from police/Action Fraud  
The reporting victims in general did not receive extensive support and advice as a result of their report. 
A tiny number experienced an investigation. There was little evidence of advice on the prevention of 
future cybercrimes been provided and many of the victims remembering or taking note of it. There 
was also evidence that the information received was the very basic.   
 
Information/advice from Action Fraud  
Most victims interviewed who reported to Action Fraud did not recall receiving any or very much 
support if there case resulted in no police interest. Victims received letters and emails (with links to 
further advice) which most did not pursue, note or remember. Cameron noted he had received such 
emails from Action Fraud, but the nature of them led him to delete them. The official classification of 
the correspondence also seems to confuse the victim:  
 
In September I got an email that I’m looking at, at the moment, it says Action Fraud and Lloyd’s 
Bank ask for your assistance to help prevent cybercrime, not protectively marked. 
Classification in red, not protectively marked. Dear sir/madam, and then a bunch of stuff, so 
naturally it says not protectively marked which means ignore this. Whether it’s valid or not, I 
don’t know. But if that comes from AF victim contact, City of London, PNN Police UK, that’s 
scary, not protectively marked. Cameron. [Attempted Hacking, Individual].  
 
Kathy did not recall any support:  
 
I didn’t get any support and certainly no updates. It was basically thanks, we’ll look into it. 
Kathy. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Justin received an acknowledgement and no further advice or support.  
 
But I'm fairly sure it was just an acknowledgement. I don't remember ever speaking to anyone 
before I spoke to the police officer who said, they weren't taking any action. Yes, this is the 
fraud confirmation. Justin. [Hacking, SMO].  
 
Terry could not recall receiving any specific support, although he did look at the Action Fraud website, 
which he found useful and he did get regular emails from them:  
 
I get emails occasionally, yeah… Terry. [Computer virus, Individual].  
 
Angeline received an email a few months later:  
 
About six months later, I got an email. I’m sorry, it’s coming back to me as we speak. Yeah, I 
got an email about six months later telling me, basically, that there was no action that could 
be taken and explaining… If I could find the email… Angeline. [Hacking, individual].  
 
Paul received basic correspondence but noted he had been advised action was unlikely:  
 
I think it was open for a while, and then I think I received correspondence saying that there 
wasn’t enough evidence, so there was nothing to investigate.  Paul. [Hacking and denial of 
service attack, individual].  
 
Claire compared the support she received from Barclays, which she thought was better than Action 
Fraud:  
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I think it was Barclays that did more. They gave me a couple of helplines, support and that, 
and I think it must have been through Barclays that I heard about what you were doing at the 
university and that. I’m sure it was Barclays. Claire. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Some victims, however, did note some positive advice from Action Fraud. Adrian who was the son of 
Hilda noted:  
 
Well, I think the advice was to create an account or get me or my sister or someone to look 
after it and perhaps, well they definitely gave her the right advice like, don’t do this on the 
phone, don’t say this, no one is ever going to ask you for your details on the phone.  I kind of 
think she already knew that but she was going through a bit of a…I don’t know.  My granddad 
had just died, her dad, so she was not happy, you know.  Adrian. [Son of Hilda, Hacking, 
Individual).  
 
Several victims were also confused by what Action Fraud actually is thinking it is specialist police unit 
dedicated to investigating fraud, rather than a reporting centre. Joana thought she got a letter from 
the fraud squad when it was Action Fraud. Some thought they were actually communicating with fraud 
squad police officers at Action Fraud.  
 
Awareness of sources for advice/support to prevent victimisation  
There are a wide range of websites offering support that are either run by official bodies or have the 
endorsement of them. Figure 8.1 lists some of the main websites identified during this research 
relevant to the UK.  
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Figure 8.1. Websites offering advice and support in relation to computer misuse offences5  
 
 
Name of Website  
 
 
URL 
 
Description  
 
Recognition 
among 
victims 
Action Fraud  https://www.actionfraud.police.uk/  Official reporting 
website, with 
description of different 
types of CM crime and 
general prevention 
advice  
Medium 
Getsafeonline  https://www.getsafeonline.org/ Extensive advice on 
different types of CM 
crime with specific 
advice 
Low 
Take five to stop 
fraud 
https://takefive-stopfraud.org.uk/ Fraud prevention 
advice with some 
overlap with CM crime 
Low 
National Cyber 
Security Centre  
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/ Extensive advice for 
individuals, SME/O on 
prevention of different 
types of CM offences  
Low  
Haveibeenpwned https://haveibeenpwned.com/  
 
Website where a 
person can check if an 
account has been 
compromised 
Very low 
Nomoreransom https://www.nomoreransom.org/e
n/about-the-project.html  
 
Website offering 
advice on tackling 
ransomware 
Very low  
Note: 
1. Cyberaware now leads direct to National Cyber Security Centre and has been excluded from 
above, but was treated separately in survey.  
 
A significant finding was that not only did most victims have little awareness of these websites both 
before the incident, but after the incident too. One would expect those who have been victims to seek 
more information on prevention and those reporting to receive such information. The survey data and 
interview data did not provide evidence to support the positive change one would expect (to be 
discussed later). These show for:  
 
                                                          
5 Other websites found which offered good advice, not listed in figure 8.1 above:  
 
● Very good advice on preventing and dealing with CM offences from a relationship, domestic 
abuse and stalking type perspective https://www.refuge.org.uk/our-work/forms-of-
violence-and-abuse/tech-abuse-2/resources/ 
● Another related to domestic abuse from the USA https://hackblossom.org/domestic-
violence/ 
● Victim Support has some general advice https://www.victimsupport.org.uk/crime-
info/types-crime/cyber-crime 
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● Action Fraud  
o 24.6% very aware before, 34.1% after 
o 31.3% unaware before, 17.9% after  
 
● Getsafeonline  
o 17.5% very aware before, 25.4% after 
o 45.6% unaware before, 34.9% after 
 
● National Cyber Security Centre 
o 19.8% very aware before 27.4% after 
o 37.7% unaware before, 27.8% after  
 
● Take five to stop fraud 
o 15.1% very aware before, 22.2% after 
o 49.6% unaware before, 36.1% after  
 
For these main websites there is a positive movement in terms of awareness after the incident, but 
still not brilliant. Action Fraud as the reporting body and most prominent website only has just over a 
third of respondents very aware of after the incident and almost a fifth unaware. This finding was also 
found in the interviews with victims. It closely relates to a finding of the lack of changes in security 
behaviours of some victims as a result of the incident. Justin, who was responsible for cyber security 
in his school could not identify any:  
 
Not on the top of my head. No. Justin. [Hacking, SMO].  
 
Others also fell into this category:  
 
I haven’t look at any of those. Catherine. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
I’ve just never heard of them. Angeline. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Jackie, who was a police officer, had only heard of Action Fraud:  
 
…even in the police I’ve not been told of any other one. Jackie. [Hacking, individual].  
 
Oliver was also only aware of Action Fraud:  
 
I know...I'm trying to think, is it...I'm sure Action Fraud has something within their website, 
when I'm doing research for something to do with work.  I use their website as a sort of go to 
for information.  But I mean other than the software security companies that's the only one I 
can think of. Oliver. [Computer virus, hacking].  
 
Some, however, did think if they needed specific advice they could find it:  
 
Not specific ones, but if I needed advice, I know that I could just google it. Paul. [Hacking and 
Denial of Service, Individual].  
 
I wasn’t aware of any but I guess you could just google some and it’ll come up.  But not off the 
top of my head. Lilt. [Computer virus, individual].  
 
 76 
 
No, I mean, no, I mean you know I suppose, if I was looking for it, I’d just google in whatever 
it is I want, yeah. Benjamin. [Hacking, individual].  
 
An issue for some victims was determining if a website was genuine or legitimate.  
 
I’m aware of a couple but then they look a bit dodgy so I’m like, because you don’t know 
what’s real, what’s dodgy these days.  Ralph. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
Not all victims behaved this way and there was some evidence of victims using advice found from 
suggested websites or searching for advice and support themselves. Steve had made use of the 
website nomoreransom to help deal with his incident. Lily had googled for ideas of support and how 
to deal with the incident. 
 
 
Visit or contact from the police to take a statement or provide support  
A small number of victims received a telephone call from the police, others a visit. In Sabrina’s case 
because of the possible hacking by a terrorist group of her website she received both a call and a visit 
from the police. However, she commented:  
 
I didn’t get any sense of his knowledge level on cyber security or hacking in particular, he was 
really concerned with taking information from me, and getting everything I knew, and 
everything that we’d experienced.  Sabrina. [Hacking, SME].  
 
However, following the visit she felt it was a logging process with little intervention to try and prevent 
such incidents occurring again.  
 
It was efficient, but my perception of the situation was it was really a logging process, and I 
didn’t know what was going to happen then, for them.  I certainly felt like we’d been taken 
seriously, that an officer had come out to speak to me.  But there was no follow up process, 
in terms of, can we talk to you about…given that we’re a journalism organisation, could we 
talk to you about maybe improving your cyber security, or having an awareness, or anything 
like that.  There was nothing like that, but everybody I dealt with was professional, but as I 
say, the perception I came away with was really, it was a log-in process…and it was no real 
concern of mine, from their point of view, what happened afterwards. Sabrina. [Hacking, 
SME]. 
 
Two victims actually identified leads they felt could locate the offender (the reality might have been 
different), but were frustrated at the police response to this information. Alex had actually done his 
own research to try and identify the offender and wanted to give this to the police to help their 
investigation, but was disappointed with their lack of interest:  
 
The response was disappointing. I wanted to basically hand over the information I had which 
I thought might be of benefit, if they know that an address is associated with hacking then if 
that popped up again they could use it, or they could just knock on his door. That’s also an 
option, especially because one of the photos… So as part of this, and it kind of like encourages 
somewhat defensive and paranoid behaviour, so of all the different accounts that he was 
using I was scrolling to see if there was anything I could use to defend myself in the future. So 
one of the things I was able to find was what looked like a photograph, some sort of selfie, 
and so that’s in my folder of information that maybe this person…and a whole bunch of some 
of the names that he seemed to be using, especially the older ones before he adopted 
nicknames and stuff. So I did a little bit of snooping just so I had something to fall back on. 
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And I thought it was reasonable and potentially valuable for the police to have that as a 
resource of…not necessarily evidence, but certainly associated. Alex. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Jerry had also identified the offender’s address and was disappointed there was no interest:  
 
At that point, I phoned Action Fraud and explained to them, and gave them the details. And 
they said, well, there's probably not a lot we can do.  At which point, I said, well, do you want 
their address?  Because I'd logged into my Ali Express account and changed the password 
straightaway, and they hadn't had a chance to remove their address from the delivery details 
as yet.  So I had the name, the address and the phone number for the person who it was being 
delivered to, in Manchester. Jerry. [Hacking, individual].  
 
Some victims did receive extensive support. For Catherine, however, she had experienced regular 
contact and advice from the police. They had taken a statement from her and the officer kept in 
regular contact updating her on the case and giving her advice:  
 
He’s messaged most days really.  So he left another message today.  He’s either emailed or 
phoned.  He’s sent loads of long emails with lots of different links and other things and 
suggesting I should do passport manager and other things. Catherine. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Claire in addition to reporting to Action Fraud, even though they advised her not to, also contacted 
the police because she was very worried and low at that point. She received a referral to Victim 
Support from them, which she contacted:  
 
[the police] Just quite supportive on the phone and that, and then they gave me another 
helpline number and it was like a victim support thing. And I did call it and, I don’t know, I 
think it made me worse. I just sat on this phone crying to this lady, but I was still in shock then, 
I think, and I couldn’t believe I’d lost all my money and we were panicking about the mortgage 
and the house and everything and what were we going to do? 
 
Several SMEs received a visit or contact from the police once reported, but felt the police lacked 
expertise and the capability to deal with such crime. Mark received a visit from a police officer:   
 
Yeah, he did say, look I don’t think this is…we’re going to get much out of this, you know, we’ll 
keep a record of it and if…it might help in other cases and similarity of other cases. But 
whether we actually solve the case or, you know, bring anybody to justice for it, I doubt, you 
know, that’s what he said, that was it but he, certainly in terms of his technical ability, was 
very limited. ‘Cause, I said to him, I can remember saying to him, I think…’cause he said, how 
do you think they got in? I said, I don’t know, if I knew I would, you know. ‘Cause it’s a secure 
thing, I said, but from one of the files on the logs that I…it looked like it came from an IP 
address which is not known to me. And, when I did a trace on that it goes to somewhere in 
Eastern Europe, I said, and that’s as far as I’ve got. And, he didn’t understand that. And, he 
didn’t understand where the various files were, so his IT skills were very limited. Mark 
[Ransomware, SME].  
Mathew, also experienced a police response that showed limited capability: 
We sent off all the investigation results and the reports to him and he probably came back to 
us, I would say, within about three weeks approximately, something like that, just to say that 
there's nothing we can do really about it. Yeah, it's too difficult to trace, yeah. Mathew. 
[Hacking, SME].  
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Authur experienced a police visit (staff and officers) which exposed their lack of knowledge and 
resources:  
One of the lads that came down here…  The initial bobbies that come down, they said, right, 
we’re going to send someone to copy your hard drives.  I said, bearing in mind, it’s 4 or 5 
terabytes you need to copy, they said, yeah.  The police cybercrimes unit don’t have all of 
these police officers; they employ some of the lads fresh out of uni.  As you work in a uni, a 
piece of paper means absolutely rat shit… 
 
He went on:  
So he [police IT specialist] comes down, he sits where you’re sat, and he gets this docking 
station out.  See, this…it’s a £4.99 docking station for hard drives off eBay.  I said, I binned 
them about five years ago ‘cause they’re crap, they’re outdated.  Oh, no, no, [this will work 
20:35], so he plugs it in and starts copying it across.  He asks me a load of questions for about 
an hour and he says, well this is going to take all weekend, this.  I said, I did tell you that.  Well, 
ooh, oh…  I said, just take the hard drive with you. 
 
The knowledge of the police IT specialist were further exposed:  
Now, there was another bobby with him who was an actual copper, sat with him, who knew 
nothing about computers whatsoever and he admit it.  He was just coming with him.  He was 
doing the questions when he was doing the IT.  I said, just take the hard drives with you.  So 
he starts picking up the laptop and the copper is shaking his head, it’s the hard drives.  So this 
is the computer guy who’s looking, well what do you mean, will I take the hard drive out the 
laptop?  I said, the hard drive that you’re copying across that are right next to the laptop, take 
it with you.  Huh, hey, what?  So the bobby who knew nothing about IT had to show him what 
the hard drive was to take with him. Authur. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Experience of police investigation  
Some victims did experience some evidence there was a police investigation, but it did not lead to 
anything:  
 
I then got a response off the police, saying, nothing was going to happen, there wasn’t enough 
evidence or whatever.  But then a few months later, or this might have been last year, I got 
an email off someone from Action Fraud, saying that they’d re-opened it, ‘cause they’d had 
more evidence, and they wanted me to answer some questions. Paul. [Hacking and Denial of 
Service Attack, Individual].  
 
This, however, did not lead to any success in bringing to justice the perpetrators. Arnold received a 
visit from the police on the day of the report:  
 
They were excellent, they came in, I think, later that afternoon they were in. They actually 
came in in person, they sat down, we laid out exactly what had happened, they obviously 
advised us don’t pay anything. Arnold. [Ransomware, SME].  
They received further contact:  
 
 79 
 
They…if I remember correctly, they contacted us about a week later to know if we’d…you 
know, just to follow up saying is all of our data 100 per cent okay, have we heard anything 
further from them. Arnold. [Ransomware, SME]. 
 
And then further contact:  
 
…gave us an update just to say, look, they hadn’t managed to decrypt the files but they were 
looking into it because… And we had a brief chat about the whole NHS situation and the fact 
that that had gone on but that was it, that was the sum total. I think because there was no 
damages, there was no insurance claim, there was no…it just became a fairly low priority, you 
know. Arnold. [Ransomware, SME]. 
 
Leo experienced informal help, where the police visited his estranged wife and warned her not engage 
in such behaviour:  
 
The office I spoke to at Humberside he was fantastic. I handed the form to him but he was 
perfectly honest, he says, we might have the address, we know who did it, but it’s a choice of 
three people: my wife, my stepson or his partner. Because they were all living in the same 
address. It’s a case to prove who actually did it, that’s the difficult part. But he said he would 
go and have a word with them, warn them off the record if it happens again the police would 
be taking action. But he was totally straight with me, he said there’s no way the CPS would 
take it into prosecution, but if it keeps happening then you would have a case of harassment. 
Leo. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
We went on:  
 
No, they just said they’d spoken to them and it shouldn’t happen again. Leo. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
 
Only Sophie, Sarah, Natalie, Benjamin and Mary experienced a successful police (or NCA) investigation 
resulting in a judicial outcome. Mary’s organisation received police interest when the case reached 
the media, but not initially. Sophie made her report via the telephone to Action Fraud and two weeks 
later she received contact from the police when a visit was arranged to take her statement. She was 
happy with the process and received regular updates as the case progressed:  
 
[Updates on case] I did, through the process.  I mean, he would certainly keep me updated 
with any new information. Sophie. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
 She also received advice from the police on enhancing her security:  
And that was one of the things…I mean, I always thought it was anyway.  But, after that, 
obviously the first thing that the police say to you is, you must make sure that you change 
everything, and step up your security settings, et cetera, et cetera, so obviously you do.  So, 
I’m far more aware of that sort of thing now, than I ever was. Sophie. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
The case resulted in a police caution for the offender. However, Sophie was not happy with this and 
had wanted it to go to court and for a tougher sanction to be applied.  
I just wish the outcome had been a stronger outcome in my favour.  I think that he got off too 
lightly, considering that he tried to ruin mine and my family’s future.  Yeah, I would have had 
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my day in court, if I’d have had my way.  And unfortunately that opportunity wasn’t given to 
me.  I’d have shut him down.  I’d have stopped him from trading, which is something that 
could have happened, that could have been an outcome. Sophie. [Hacking, Individual]. 
 
Sarah also experienced a police investigation, but which also involved the National Crime Agency in 
relation to a financial investigation of the offenders.  
I think they [Action Fraud] were very good, having spoken to somebody on the phone, they 
then asked, would I be willing to make a statement, and a policewoman would come and take 
that statement.  And, in fact, one did, she came, she identified herself, she come from, I think 
it was Hexham Police Station, and ended up in Northumberland, and she took my statement.  
I said, I’ve written one out and she said we need to do it from scratch.  So, she did and I signed 
it and she went off.  And, it was then, they said they would investigate and keep me informed.  
And, the next I think that I knew was that I got a letter from [name of team]  Criminal Finance 
Team based in Bristol..  Sarah [Hacking, Individual].  
 
She was very happy with the police and NCA who regularly kept her updated throughout the case. She 
was also asked if she would be willing to go to court, which she agreed, but did not have to. The case 
resulted in the offenders been found guilty and assets confiscated. She commented:  
 
I thought it was very good the support that I got from them and to get the updates and would 
I be willing to be a witness, if necessary, and I said, yes, I would.  But in fact, that proved not 
to be necessary, which in a sense was quite good, quite a relief. Sarah [Hacking, Individual].    
 
Natalie’s case also resulted in a successful case of conviction arising from an NCA investigation. She 
compared the response of the NCA dealing with the hacking incident to the local police when burgled:  
 
[The NCA] Very good, as far as I was concerned.  I’d never come across them before, at all, but 
they certainly rang up periodically, and kept me informed and told me what was going on, 
which is entirely different from the various burglaries that we’ve had over time… [where no 
police response]. Natalie. [Hacking, SME].  
 
She also felt they kept her well informed throughout the case:  
 
And the National Crime Agency have been very good.  They ring me up about every four, six 
months, something like that and said, it’s going to court in March, no, it’s been postponed or 
whatever, they’ve just kept me up to date.  And then they rang me a month or six weeks ago, 
something like that, not a huge amount of time ago, to say that some people had been 
convicted, and it was one of a number of frauds that they’d been prosecuted for. Natalie. 
[Hacking, SME].  
 
Benjamin experienced a successful investigation from the NCA and he had only reported to the bank, 
so was surprised when they contacted him and then embarked upon a successful investigation:  
 
Well, I suppose, my reaction when…because I had a couple of phone calls from, and I think it 
was the NCA, plus a visit from somebody from the NCA, and then there was about four letters 
that came in over the last year, two from one agency, two from the other. And, they were 
letting me know, I suppose, that the crime was being followed up, you know, right the way to 
the point when the trial was due, and then the outcome of the trial. So, I suppose, I was quite 
grateful really to be kept in touch with that. Benjamin. [Hacking, Individual].  
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Survey victims’ views overall on Action Fraud, the police and other organisations 
compared 
The survey sought general data on the views of victims on Action Fraud and the police overall. The 
table 8.2 below provide a comparison between the police, Action Fraud and other organisations 
victims report to (such as banks, Facebook etc). Generally the scores are similar with some slight 
differences (it must be remembered the nature of the survey was such it cannot be considered 
representative of the general population):  
 
 Ease of reporting Action Fraud is slightly better than police and other, with other marginally 
better than the police.  
 The staff spoken to were well informed, Action Fraud also came out slightly better than other 
with the police behind both.  
 In terms of awareness as a result of contact, the police scored highest with other and Action 
Fraud very similar.  
 In terms of support to better equip the victim all three were very similar in score in terms of 
strongly agree/tend to agree, but Action Fraud scored significantly lower on the strongly 
agree.  
 Both the police and Action Fraud scored similarly on the response inspiring confidence in the 
police.  
 However, in terms of overall satisfaction with reporting other organisations scored slightly 
better than Action Fraud, followed by the police.    
 
 
 
Table 8.2 Survey victims’ overall views compared on Action Fraud, the police and other organisations 
    
Action 
Fraud  
Police Other  
I found it very easy to 
report the incident  
Strongly agree 36.7% 34.7% 37.8% 
 
Tend to agree 43.3% 34.7% 37.1%  
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
10.8% 18.7% 14.7% 
 
Tend to disagree 7.5% 6.7% 8.4%  
Strongly disagree 0.8% 5.3% 2.1%  
Don't know 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
The 
advisors/police/other 
I communicated with 
were well informed 
Strongly agree 32.5% 28.0% 32.2% 
 
Tend to agree 42.5% 37.3% 39.2%  
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
15.8% 24.0% 20.3% 
 
Tend to disagree 5.0% 8.0% 6.3% 
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Strongly disagree 4.2% 2.7% 2.1%  
Don't know 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
I am more aware 
about potential 
cybercrime as a 
result of contact I 
received from Action 
Fraud/police/other 
body 
Strongly agree 34.2% 32.0% 35.0% 
 
Tend to agree 35.8% 42.7% 33.6%  
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
18.3% 17.3% 20.3% 
 
Tend to disagree 10.0% 6.7% 6.3%  
Strongly disagree 1.7% 1.3% 4.9%  
Don't know 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
The support I 
received from Action 
Fraud/police/other 
made me feel better 
equipped to protect 
myself from 
cybercrime 
Strongly agree 25.0% 36.0% 33.6% 
 
Tend to agree 42.5% 32.0% 35.0%  
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
21.7% 16.0% 18.9% 
 
Tend to disagree 7.5% 12.0% 9.1%  
Strongly disagree 3.3% 4.0% 3.5%  
Don't know 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
The response I 
received from Action 
Fraud/police has 
increased my 
confidence in the 
police’s ability to 
respond to 
cybercrime 
Strongly agree 30.0% 33.3% 
 
 
Tend to agree 40.0% 36.0% 
 
 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
17.5% 18.7% 
 
 
Tend to disagree 10.0% 8.0% 
 
 
Strongly disagree 2.5% 2.7% 
 
 
Don't know 0.0% 1.3% 
 
Overall, I was 
satisfied with the 
experience of 
reporting to Action 
Strongly agree 29.2% 22.7% 32.2% 
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Fraud/police/other 
body 
 
Tend to agree 39.2% 44.0% 37.1%  
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
18.3% 20.0% 19.6% 
 
Tend to disagree 9.2% 9.3% 7.7%  
Strongly disagree 3.3% 4.0% 3.5%  
Don't know 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
 
9. Victims’ Needs 
Both the survey and interviews explored what support the victims wanted and what they actually 
received. The table shows that the survey victims saw all types of support as important. It also shows 
there is a clear gap between what they actually received and wanted. Immediate, technical and 
information were all rated as important by around three quarters or more respondents to the survey, 
but only a quarter received immediate support and less than a fifth technical support. The most 
common support received was information, but still only a third received this.  The section above on 
the police Action Fraud response also illustrated many victims not receiving many of the types of 
support listed in table 9.1.  
Table 9.1. Comparing what support victims wanted to what they actually received  
 
Type of support Support wanted 
rated very 
important 
Support wanted 
rated Important 
(very or fairly) 
What support 
victims actually 
received  
Immediate support 
– where to go and 
who to talk to 
39.2% 82.0% 25.80% 
Technical support 37.6% 76.2% 19.00% 
Information 
support 
34.9% 74.6% 33.30% 
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Emotional support 30.2% 64.0% 12.30% 
Financial support 40.2% 63.5% 6.00% 
Practical support, 
bureaucracy 
35.4% 60.3% 6.30% 
Formal 
counselling/therap
y 
30.2% 59.8% 6.70% 
Advocacy support 33.3% 55.0% 3.20% 
 
The interviews identified a number of key areas that victims identified as what they wanted in terms 
of support.     
Information about the case and what happened 
Many of the victims interviewed did not know exactly what had happened, who had perpetrated the 
attack and what the authorities were going to do. This basic information was central to what many of 
the victims wanted:  
Well, really, nobody. I mean, I did feel a little bit at the time like…that I wanted somebody to 
come back to me to tell me what had happened, but nobody did, they just sort of said… Ann. 
[Hacking, Individual].  
 
Or, not even if, ‘cause obviously, yeah, people don’t always get caught do they?  But even just 
to know what they’d done, or what had happened, what they’d maybe explored, and you 
know, that information might be available, if I contacted them and said, excuse me, can you 
give me all the information?  But whether they would, I don’t know.  It would be nice to sort 
of know what’s happened behind the scenes. Paul. [Hacking and Denial of Service Attack].  
 
It would have been good to know that the police could have done something. I guess leaving 
it open-ended, saying, yeah, we just can’t trace these people, I guess that makes you feel 
slightly insecure online. And how the person got my Facebook password as well, because I’m 
assuming somebody would have had to log in as me, and that was a worrying thing. Angeline. 
[Hacking, Individual].  
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Technical support  
The most important support victims wanted was technical support. This related to immediate 
technical support to rectify their situation, support to provide reassurance such an incident would not 
happen again and longer term preventative support. Several of the victims had sought technical 
support via friends/family, a specialist contractor or stores such as PC World. This type of support as 
some of the following quotes from interviews was the most clear type of support they wanted. Jing 
wanted one simple thing:  
Make my computer work. Jing. [Computer Virus, Individual] 
 
Nigel similarly wanted such support to restore lost files:  
It’s then having the specialist to be able to do it I suppose. They could I suppose if I was, there’s 
my hard drive, take it away and solve it like that. Nigel. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
Gweneth also wanted such support.  
 
Practical, yeah, I think that would be useful just so the IT department, or whoever's relevant, 
can go through how to deal with this process and what's the best course of action should it 
happen to you. Gweneth. [Computer Virus, Individual].  
 
As did Oliver:  
 
Yeah, technical support.  Because I don't think everyone's PC savvy to be totally honest. Oliver. 
[Computer virus, individual].   
 
 
Lily wanted specific advice on what is good anti-virus protection:  
 
Yeah, that would have been good because there’s so many anti-viruses which say all different 
things, so I wasn’t sure which one to get and which was more secure and stuff like that.  So 
yeah, that would have been handy. Lily. [Computer Virus, Individual].  
 
Catherine who had been hacked wanted specific advice on a password manager (which in her case 
was a rare example of a police officer who was actually helping her to do this):  
Just about the password manager and other safety things that…No, just more information 
about how to move forward from it and not let it happen again, really. Catherine. [Hacking, 
Individual].  
 
Ralph who had been a victim of ransomware wanted technical support that would make such an attack 
again unlikely: 
Someone to come and check the antivirus.  Check the normal file settings and stuff like that. 
Someone to trust.  Even if, they don’t have to come in.  They can do an IT team viewer job 
thing.  And just have a look and say, look, this is where it’s failing.  We suggest you do this.  It 
takes about ten minutes.  That’s all you could have done.  That would have helped. Ralph. 
[Ransomware, SME].  
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Aliya simply wanted to speak to someone with technical skills in the police who would understand her 
incident:  
 
I think I would have liked to have been able to speak to an IT genius in this police force, or that 
that should land, my case should land on the desk of someone who really understood IT crime. 
Aliya. [Ransomware, SME].  
 
Justin also wanted further technical support to reassure him that the website would now be resilient 
to future attacks:  
I mean, well, you know, advice on…depending on how much they looked into it, obviously, I 
provided them all the information I provided to you about how the attacks took place. So, if 
they had come back with some feedback, so, you know, you've got an unsecured FTP server, 
you should really think about securing this, if you haven't already. Or something to say, that 
they’ve looked into how this had happened and steps we could take to prevent it. Hackers will 
do that stuff anyway, but it would be nice if they were providing that, sort of, feedback. Justin. 
[Hacking, SMO].  
 
Henry wanted a website that would provide all the information necessary to do what is necessary:  
I think that if they worked together to provide a website that you could just go to and say, 
right, this is what you need to do. And it’s got a checklist for you of everything: the banks, 
Action Fraud, internet security. And also, of absolutely critical importance, information on 
how this functions, to give some sort of reassurance. You know, I can’t emphasise enough for 
me, in particular, the need for reassurance and re-empowerment. And the sooner that could 
happen, the better. And so, with something like this, if there were a website that were 
available, that said well you’ve got to do all these things, of course you have, that goes without 
thinking. But then there are these resources, which will help you to feel better about what has 
happened. That, I think, will be absolutely superb. Because I don’t think I’m alone in that 
feeling. And that, you know, that need to be reassured was as powerful as shutting everything 
down and doing all the responsible things. Henry. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
As did Wayne:  
 
Well, yes, I think had at my initial point of asking for help, had at that initial point somebody 
said, you know what, Wayne, we’ll have a look at it, but in the meantime, please have a look 
at this website and these are the things you can do and these are things you can be getting on 
with, then that would have helped, rather than just the, we’ll be in touch.  Because even if 
you go on self-help websites, sometimes you think, you know, am I doing the right thing doing 
this, but if there was a UK government page, that would have helped me no end. Wayne. 
[Harassment, individual].  
 
 
Sabrina wanted technical support that would immediately come and deal with an incident:  
Technical knowledge, someone with technical knowledge.  So, there’s the immediate 
emergency of what happens, and we needed someone for that.  Beyond that, there’s a context 
that you’re working in, there’s an awareness that you are working in a digital context, and 
exactly as if you were in a university building, or if you were in a building that’s on the high 
street, you wouldn’t go out and leave your door unlocked when you leave the office that night, 
you wouldn’t leave your data unprotected, that, we needed, and that we still don’t have, 
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actually.  I don’t have a comprehensive knowledge, I have the knowledge I picked up through 
things that happened, but that’s not the same as starting from the ground, and having 
someone explain to you, so you come out of something with, right, these are the things, these 
are my main priorities.  I think we still need that, to be honest. Sabrina. [Hacking, SME].  
 
Mary also wanted police with technical knowledge to work with to deal with the incident:  
Someone who was an expert in cyber attacks who could give us meaningful avenues to pursue. 
Police resource to track down the perpetrators. Cooperation from platforms - Twitter/ 8 chan 
to cooperate with the police re passing on relevant details about the hackers. Mary. [Denial 
of service attack, SME].  
 
Patricia thought police officers should be better trained in digital crime:  
It's not great.  I mean, if I could suggest anything, there needs to be better training around 
digital crime for sure.  You know, harassment should not be…once it reaches a certain level, 
there needs to be a threshold, it should really be a TC because it's complicated. And there's 
very little…I mean, people like [inaudible 0:49:32] and Suzy Lamplugh Trust, they're 
overwhelmed. Patricia. [Multiple, individual].  
 
What did I want the most?  I didn't want it to obviously affect the business to the point where 
you can't take credit cards payments anymore, that's for sure, because that would have been 
the end which if it happens repeatedly they can do that, stop you from taking them.  But, do 
you know, I don't know, I found the resources were very limited, there's hardly any help really 
apart from, unless you pay for a private body to do it for you.  so there was very little 
assistance, which for an SME, you know, these people [inaudible 07:11] are incredibly 
expensive. Mathew. [Hacking, individual].  
 
Offenders brought to justice  
Several victims stated they wanted the perpetrators of the incident brought to justice:  
 
I would love to have received they’d caught the perpetrator, that was the main purpose of my 
call. Terry. [Computer Virus, Individual].  
 
Rachael reflected that although dealing with the incident and resolving it had been her immediate 
priority, on reflection she thought catching the perpetrators would have been good.  
Yeah, I mean, getting rid of the problem, rather than catching the perpetrators, was my 
priority. But now, on reflection…at the time you can’t help but think your political opponents 
are the ones who are responsible for it. I have no evidence of that obviously, and so on 
reflection, I would like people to be held accountable for that. Rachael. [Denial of Service 
Attack, Individual].  
 
Joana also wanted to know that action was taking place to catch the perpetrators:  
At the point of the incident, well I didn’t really need…I didn’t really…it wasn’t the advice I 
wanted, it was the support I wanted, I wanted somebody to…I wanted to feel that this wasn’t 
going to be getting away with it, you know. But there was no implication, it was, I think, this 
is the trouble with this global world, is that the more global it gets the more alone you feel, if 
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you see what I mean. ‘Cause, oh, he’s miles away oh we can’t do anything about him, you 
know, it’s just…and you’re just little needle in the haystack, kind of thing, so, yeah, I didn’t 
really need any advice ‘cause I knew I’d, actually, been scammed and I’d been stupid, and I 
felt relieved. But what I did want to know is, I wanted to feel that this bloke sitting in his palace 
in Nigeria wasn’t going to get away with it, but he’s still doing it. Jonana. [Hacking, individual].  
 
Just more support to track them down really, the people who'd done it. Mathew. [Hacking, 
individual].  
 
Kate just wanted her ex-boyfriend to know he was breaking the law:  
 
Yeah, I just wanted to protect myself from that happening again, from him, to let him know 
that that was breaking the law, and that is was a punishable kind of crime. Kate. [Hacking, 
individual].  
 
Reassurance  
Several victims mentioned reassurance as a need. These victims had been rendered feeling vulnerable 
as a consequence of the incident and desired some form of reassurance to help cope with it. Henry 
had almost lost a large sum of money an reassurance was very important to him:  
 
In one word, reassurance. Reassurance, which was, I suppose, a form of re-empowering. I felt 
totally disempowered by that, because we’ve become so reliant on our phones and everything 
else and to have that invaded takes away your power. Henry. [Hacking, Individual].  
 
Terry just wanted to be sure that criminals did not have information that could be used to target him 
as a result of the incident.  
I think I just wanted reassurance that I hadn’t…I knew I hadn’t given them any information, 
but I just wanted assurance I wasn’t going to be bugged again by them. Terry. [Computer Virus, 
Individual].  
 
Lily also wanted reassurance:  
For them to actually seem interested in investigating it, seeing who it was or where it came 
from and just reassurance that they wasn’t going to take my money because I didn’t know 
whether they had access to my online banking and stuff like that.   In the 50 hours, I was going 
away for the weekend to London, and I was just worried that when I was away they would 
take all my money.  So just like some reassurance. Lily. [Computer Virus, Individual].  
 
 
10. Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
This research has provided some important new data on victims of CMC. First it has shown that most 
victims regard CMC as an equivalent crime to traditional crimes like burglary, with some considering 
it more serious, with a small minority regarding it as a lesser crime. The research demonstrated victims 
experience many of the impacts that other crime victims experience, with some overlap with fraud. 
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There were also some victims who suffered severe impacts, as well as some noting very small impacts 
and regarding it as little more than disruption.  
The research explored how victims fell victim and showed in some cases they were tricked by 
sophisticated social engineering, some exhibited poor security behaviours putting them at greater risk, 
but some also had very good behaviours but still fell victim. The research explored the changes in 
behaviour as a result of victimisation and it showed in general there were not major changes. The 
reasons victims did not report were examined and then the experiences of those that did. The 
response of the police and Action Fraud, where there was a response was also explored. The report 
ended by considering what the victims wanted.  
The findings from this research lead the authors to make the following recommendations, which fall 
under the following categories: improving reporting, improving victim support and advice, increasing 
resources for tackling computer misuse.  
Improving reporting 
The experience of the researchers dealing with victims and trying to understand their interpretations 
of what happened illustrated the challenges of definition. This was highlighted further with data 
supplied by the NFIB, which showed there had been misclassification of victims, not just among web 
reporters. The research was conducted with data drawn before changes to the online reporting system 
and better quality checks were introduced. Many of these issues may therefore have already been 
addressed. However, it is essential that those reporting cybercrimes are properly classified for both 
measurement, investigation and response issues.   
Recommendation 1. The new systems for reporting, classifying and ensuring the quality of decisions 
undertaken by Action Fraud and National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) should be regularly 
monitored and evaluated to ensure the classification of CMC reports for both telephone and web 
reporting are being classified accurately [Directed at Action Fraud/NFIB].  
The central challenge of the name Action Fraud is for many victims this does not sound like a body 
cybercrime should be reported to, particularly when it does not involve fraud. Another challenge to 
reporting CMC (and fraud) is the name Action Fraud and the association of the word ‘Action’ with 
investigation and response, rather than reporting. Some victims actually think it is a special fraud 
investigation squad, which implies there will be an investigation by Action Fraud. For these reasons 
the researchers think the name should be changed.  
Recommendation 2. Action Fraud should be renamed the ‘National Fraud and Cybercrime Reporting 
Centre’ [Directed at Home Office, City of London Police]. 
This report identified a number of barriers to individuals reporting CMC offences. There are a number 
of recommendations below which aided with a focused communication strategy could enhance 
reporting:  
Recommendation 3. Greater prominence should be made of CMC offences on the Action Fraud 
website [Directed at Action Fraud].  
Recommendation 4. All police reporting websites should be reviewed to assess information 
provided on reporting CMC and where there are gaps advised to more clearly indicate how 
cybercrime can be reported with relevant links provided [Directed to Home Office and all police 
forces].    
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Recommendations 5. The NCSC should work with key bodies such as Action Fraud, Getsafeonline; 
relevant service providers, such as banks, social networking sites, email providers etc who receive 
cybercrime reports, to provide a common set of words and website links to be placed upon their 
website to encourage them to report as crime [Directed to NCSC, Action Fraud and relevant website 
providers].    
There was also evidence of some staff who might receive or advise on reports did not grasp the 
legislation relating to CMC, particularly related to non-financial related crime such as harassment, 
voyeurism and domestic disputes where the research found examples of victims being wrongly 
advised their case was not a crime. The authors therefore suggest that all relevant police staff and 
Action Fraud staff should receive training in CMC offences and where such training already occurs, it 
should be regularly reviewed to ensure those experiencing it clearly understand what constitutes this 
type of crime, the seriousness of it and options for victims:   
Recommendation 6. All police officers, police staff and Action Fraud staff dealing with victims who 
may report crimes should be better trained in what constitutes CMC offences, particularly in relation 
to non-financial related cases such as voyeurism, harassment and domestic disputes; and the 
options for dealing with them [Directed to Home Office, College of Policing, Action Fraud].   
Improving victim support and advice 
The findings noted limited changes in behaviour by some victims from the survey and interviews. 
There were examples of victims who were hacked not improving their password security and 
computer virus victims not engaging with anti-virus software. Some of the interview victims at the 
point of victimisation were clearly interested in cyber security, but were not offered appropriate 
tailored advice. This seemed to be a missed opportunity at the point of victimisation to enhance the 
resilience of the victim. The Economic Crime Victim Care Unit (ECVCU) pilot is an illustration of moves 
to more intensive support for this type of victim. This research has not evaluated the ECVCU and some 
of its activities would overlap with the following recommendation:  
Recommendation 7. Tailored packages of advice/support (based on National Cyber Security Centre 
guidance/advice) relating to the specific type of incident should be supplied to the victim at the 
point of reporting and evaluation of this support should be undertaken regularly to improve it 
[Directed at Action Fraud and the NCSC]. 
Recommendation 8. Further research should be conducted to evaluate different approaches to 
targeting victims and the impact these have on behaviours and future victimisation [Directed at 
Home Office].  
There was evidence of victims not receiving information on the progress of their case, which is 
contrary to the Victims Code. There was also considerable variation in the nature and extent of the 
responses victims received.  
Recommendation 9. Action Fraud and the police should do more to ensure victims do receive timely 
information on what has occurred in relation to their case [Directed at the police and Action Fraud].  
The Action Fraud website was the most recognised by victims, but the research team’s views were 
that it was not necessarily the best at supplying information to victims on prevention, support etc of 
CMC related offences. Getsafeonline and the National Cyber Security Centre provided the best advice 
in the view of the research team, but were low down the recognition list of victims. Action Fraud could 
either develop new website or link in a more effective way to the better websites. It might also be 
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prudent to conduct some research with victims to determine the most effective websites for offering 
advice.  
Recommendation 10. Action Fraud, with the most recognised website offering advice, should work 
with the National Cyber Security Centre to ensure consistent and technically accurate advice on 
preventing and dealing with cybercrime  is provided to victims. This should also be built upon 
research to determine the most effective websites for interesting and changing the behaviour of 
victims [Directed at Home Office, Action Fraud, National Cyber Security Centre].   
Increasing resources for tackling computer misuse 
The findings for this research found many victims who did not receive a police investigation or any 
other form of police interest. Some victims did not want any police support, but many did. There were 
also cases where victims thought they had clear leads on who the offenders were (although in reality 
those leads may have been weak), but nothing occurred. It is clear that many victims who want police 
support do not receive it. There are clearly not enough resources of the police dedicated to CMC and 
many of the resources that do exist are built upon short-term funding, with no guarantee they will 
continue (HMICFRS, 2019). The authors believe more resources should be dedicated to this crime, 
how much, however, is clearly a political decision when there are so many demands on the police.   
Recommendation 11. The police should dedicate greater resources towards tackling CMC [Directed 
at the Government, Home Office and the police].   
It is clear that even with more resources the police could not fill the gap in the support that victims 
want. Technical support was one of the main needs identified by victims and many of the demands 
that fall under this would not necessarily be something the police could or should provide, particularly 
in relation to SMEs. There is a challenge, however, of where to go to secure technical advice and who 
to trust. There are other examples in physical security of official schemes to indicate compliance with 
standards and that the operator is a legitimate supplier such as the Security Industry Authority’s 
Approved Contractor Scheme and the police service’s Secured by Design initiative. The National Cyber 
Security Centre has a variety of certification programmes, but these do not currently cover providers 
of cyber security services at the front line of victims. A scheme that provides a kite mark of approval 
and list of suppliers that could be provided to individual and SME victims would aid them in securing 
appropriate professional support.    
Recommendation 12. The Government should encourage a scheme to recognise suppliers who are 
accredited to appropriate standards to provide cyber security technical services to individuals and 
SMEs, similar to schemes such as Secured by Design and the SIA’s Approved Contractors Scheme. 
Victims could then be provided with links to a website which includes a list of relevant suppliers 
who have met those standards [Directed at the Home Office and National Cyber Security Centre and 
the NPCC].   
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Appendices  
Appendix 1. List of interview victims and type of offence  
 
Name of 
Victim 
 
 
Type  
 
If SME/O Type 
 
Computer Misuse 
Offence Category 
 
 
Accounts/Devices 
Involved 
 
Consequence  
Gweneth Ind  Computer 
Virus/Malware 
PC Disruption of 
PC use 
Vanessa Ind  Computer 
Virus/Malware 
Laptop Disruption of 
laptop use 
Godfrey Ind  Computer 
Virus/Malware 
PC Attempted 
fraud 
Terry  Ind   Computer 
Virus/Malware 
Mobile Phone Attempted 
fraud 
Oliver  Ind  Computer 
Virus/Malware 
Laptop Disruption of 
laptop use and 
attempted 
fraud 
Jing Ind  Computer 
Virus/Malware 
Laptop Disruption of 
laptop use 
Lily  
 
Ind  Computer 
Virus/Malware 
Laptop Disruption of 
laptop use 
Steve SME Consultancy Ransomware  PC Ransom 
attempt 
Nigel  SME Farmer Ransomware PC Ransom 
attempt 
Aliya SME Online 
Marketing  
Ransomware Website  Ransom 
attempt 
Ralph SME Arts Venue Ransomware Organisation’s 
Computers 
Ransom 
attempt 
Arnold SME Engineering  Ransomware Organisation’s 
Computers 
Ransom 
attempt 
Kellie 
 
SME Care Services Ransomware Organisation’s 
Computers 
Ransom 
attempt 
Mark SME IT Services Ransomware Servers Ransom 
attempt 
Harold Ind  Hacking Bank Account Attempted 
fraud 
Andrew Ind  Hacking  eBay Attempted 
fraud 
Charlie Ind  Hacking  Bank Account Attempted 
fraud 
James Ind  Hacking Twitter Account 
takeover for 
marketing 
Peter  Ind  Hacking  Email  Excessive spam 
mail 
Hilda Ind  Hacking Bank Account Attempted 
fraud 
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Ann Ind  Hacking  eBay  Attempted 
fraud 
Lizz Ind  Hacking  Groupon Attempted 
fraud 
Alex  Ind  Hacking  Playstation and 
Twitter 
Harassment  
Claire  Ind  Hacking  Bank Account Attempted 
fraud 
Sophie Ind  Hacking Email  To prevent 
changing 
employment 
Caroline  Ind  Hacking Email et al  Attempted 
fraud 
Catherine Ind  Hacking eBay and 
Facebook et al 
Attempted 
fraud 
Sarah  Ind  Hacking Bank Account  Attempted 
fraud 
Angeline  
 
Ind  Hacking Facebook Attempted 
fraud (of her 
network) 
Joanna Ind 
 
 Hacking  Email Account  Attempted 
fraud 
Kate Ind  Hacking  
 
Facebook account Damage her 
reputation by 
ex-lover 
Jerry  Ind  Hacking  Ali Express 
account 
Attempted 
fraud 
Benjamin  Ind  Hacking  Bank Account Attempted 
fraud 
Authur  SME IT services  Hacking  Servers  Damage 
business 
Leo   Ind  Hacking Email and Cloud 
Account 
To destroy 
evidence 
gathered for 
divorce 
proceedings 
Jacki  Ind  Hacking  Facebook and 
Instagram  
Account 
takeover for 
marketing 
Bernard Ind  Hacking  Bank Account Attempted 
fraud 
Michael  Ind  Hacking  Bank account Attempted 
fraud 
Cameron  Ind  Hacking 
(attempted) 
Bank Account Attempted 
fraud 
Henry Ind  Hacking/Compute
r Virus 
Bank Account and 
PC 
Attempted 
fraud 
Sam  Ind  Hacking and 
Computer 
Virus/Malware/R
ansom 
Laptop  To access 
webcam to 
take personal 
pictures and 
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conduct 
extortion 
Husky  Ind  Hacking and 
Computer 
Virus/Malware 
Laptop To monitor 
evidence 
gathered for 
divorce 
proceedings 
Paul Ind  Hacking and 
Denial of Service 
Attack 
eBay and Email 
Account  
Attempted 
fraud 
Natalie 
 
SME Bakery  Hacking  Bank Account Attempted 
fraud 
Kathy  SME Plumbing and 
Heating 
Engineer 
Hacking Email  Attempted 
fraud 
Mathew SME E-Commerce 
Retailer 
Hacking  Website  To gather data 
on customers 
for fraud 
Justin SMO Secondary 
School 
Hacking  Website  Diversion of 
school website 
to porn site 
Sabrina SME Online 
Publisher 
Hacking/ DDoS Website  Diversion of 
company 
website to 
terrorist group 
Rachael Ind  Denial of Service 
Attack 
Gmail Disruption of 
election 
campaign 
Guy  
 
SMO Secondary 
School 
Denial of Service 
Attack 
Organisation’s 
Cloud 
Disruption of 
school 
websites/IT 
Patricia 
 
Ind  Multiple  Multiple  Harassment, to 
secure 
intelligence and 
damage 
reputation  
Mary 
 
SME Popular 
website 
Multiple Organisation’s 
computers, 
systems and 
website 
To disrupt 
website 
Wayne Ind  Harassment 
(Hacking?) 
Multiple websites Harassment 
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Appendix 2. Demographics of survey and interview victims  
 Survey  Interviews 
Categories N % N % 
Gender      
Male 112 44.4% 25 48.1% 
Female 140 55.6% 26 50% 
Prefer not to say   1 1.9% 
Age      
18-24 52 20.6% 2 3.8% 
25-34 103 40.9% 11 21.2% 
35-44 59 23.4% 11 21.2% 
45-54 30 11.9% 9 17.3% 
55-64 5 2.0% 10 19.2% 
65-74 2 0.8% 5 9.6% 
75+ 1 0.4% 4 7.7% 
Employment Status     
Employed/Self-employed 201 79.80% 37 71.2% 
Looking after family/home 5 2.00% 0 0% 
Student 14 5.60% 6 11.5% 
Retired 4 1.60% 8 15.4% 
Unemployed  20 7.90% 0 0% 
LT Sick 5 2% 1 1.9% 
Prefer not to say 3 1% 0 0% 
Occupational Status      
Non-manual: professional 41 16.3% 30 57.7% 
Non-manual: employers and managers  47 18.7% 7 13.5% 
Non-manual: intermediate and junior 
non-manual 
39 15.5% 3 5.8% 
Manual: Skilled manual and own 
account non-professional 
46 18.3% 2 3.8% 
Manual: Semi-skilled manual and 
personal service 
38 15.1% 1 1.9% 
Manual: Unskilled 15 6.0% 0 0% 
Other 16 6.3% 8 15.4% 
Prefer not to say 10 4.0% 1 1.9% 
Education      
Higher degree/postgraduate 
qualifications 
31 12.3% 14 26.9% 
First degree (including B. Ed.) 
Postgraduate diplomas/Certificates 
(inc. PGCE) Professional qualifications 
at degree level (e.g. chartered 
accountant/surveyor) NVQ/SVQ Level 4 
or 5 
57 22.6% 12 23.1% 
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Diplomas in higher education/other 
H.E. qualifications HNC/HND/BTEC 
Higher Teaching qualifications for 
schools/further education (below 
degree level) Nursing/other medical 
qualifications (below degree level) RSA 
Higher Diploma 
43 17.1% 7 13.5% 
A/AS levels/SCE Higher/Scottish 
Certificate 6th Year Studies 
NVQ/SVQ/GSVQ level 3/GNVQ 
Advanced ONC/OND/BTEC National City 
and Guilds Advanced Craft/Final level/ 
Part III/RSA Advanced Diploma 
59 23.4% 8 15.4% 
Trade Apprenticeships 2 0.8% 2 3.8% 
O-Level/GCSE grades A-C/SCE 
Standard/Ordinary grades 1-3 CSE 
grade 1 NVQ/SVQ/GSVQ level 2/GNVQ 
intermediate BTEC/SCOTVEC 
first/General diploma City and Guilds 
Craft/Ordinary level/Part II/RSA 
Diploma 
35 13.9% 7 13.5% 
O-Level/GCSE grades D-G/SCE 
Standard/Ordinary below grade 3 CSE 
grades 2-5 NVQ/SVQ/GSVQ level 
1/GNVQ foundation BTEC/SCOTVEC 
first/General Certificate City and Guilds 
part 1/RSA Stage I-III SCOTVEC 
modules/Junior certificate 
18 7.1% 2 3.8% 
Other qualifications (including 
overseas) 
1 0.4% 0 0% 
None of the above 6 2.4% 0 0% 
Prefer not to say 0 0.0% 0 0% 
Household situation      
Lived alone 51 20.2% 10 19.2% 
Married/ live with partner 133 52.8% 27 51.9% 
Lived with family 61 24.2% 10 19.2% 
Lived with friends 4 1.6% 3 5.8% 
Prefer not to say 3 1.2% 2 3.8% 
Race      
White and Black Caribbean 1 0.4% 0 0% 
English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern 
Irish/British 
207 82.1% 48 92.3% 
Irish 4 1.6% 0 0% 
Gypsy or Irish Traveller 0 0.0% 0 0% 
Any other white background 7 2.8% 2 3.8% 
Any other Black / African / Caribbean 
background 
1 0.4% 0 0% 
Indian 5 2.0% 0 0% 
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White and Black African 3 1.2% 0 0% 
White and Asian 6 2.4% 0 0% 
Any other Mixed / Multiple ethnic 
background 
0 0.0% 0 0% 
Caribbean 4 1.6% 0 0% 
Any other ethnic group 2 0.8% 0 0% 
African 3 1.2% 0 0% 
Arab 0 0.0% 1 1.9% 
Pakistani 4 1.6% 0 0% 
Bangladeshi 0 0.0% 0 0% 
Chinese 2 0.8% 1 1.9% 
Any other Asian background 2 0.8% 0 0% 
Prefer not to say 1 0.4% 0 0% 
Region      
North East 9 3.6% 2 3.8% 
North West 30 11.9% 3 5.8% 
Yorkshire and The Humber 17 6.7% 3 5.8% 
East Midlands 19 7.5% 2 3.8% 
West Midlands 29 11.5% 1 1.9% 
East of England 17 6.7% 6 11.5% 
London 43 17.1% 4 7.7% 
South East 31 12.3% 22 42.3% 
South West 22 8.7% 5 9.6% 
Wales 13 5.2% 3 5.8% 
Scotland 19 7.5% 1 1.9% 
Northern Ireland 3 1.2% 0 0% 
Prefer not to say 0 0% 0 0% 
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Appendix 3. Non-police reporting websites  
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Appendix 4. Action Fraud Reporting Website  
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Appendix 5. Police Reporting Websites  
 
 
 
 
